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“Equal Outcomes”: A Constitutional 
Comparison of Gender Equality Guarantees 
in the United States and South Africa 
Melanie McMullen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of women’s rights throughout history has had significant 
effects on the cultural and legal climate of the world.  Each country has its 
own approach to gender equality, and each country has an impact on the global 
mindset on women’s roles in society.1  South Africa, for example, is a new 
and growing democracy that provides more equality guarantees than even the 
oldest established democracy – the United States.  The exploration of newer 
ideas and approaches to equality can only benefit the growth and expansion 
of equal rights in the United States. 
The word “equal” is a definitive quantification of sameness.2  Similarly, 
Black’s Law Dictionary states that “equality” denotes the “quality, state, or 
condition of being equal; esp[ecially], likeness in power or political status.”3  
Although the literal meaning of “equality” seems to insist that equal status, 
rights, and opportunities can exist between different groups of people, 
equality in practice will not always result in “same,” or even similar, 
 
*B.S. Socio-Political Communication, Missouri State University, 2017; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri 
Law Review, 2019-2020; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021.  I am 
grateful to Professor Oliveri for her insight and guidance during the writing of this 
Comment, my family for their input and support, as well as the Missouri Law Review 
for its help in the editing process. 
 1. This Comment seeks to understand different applications of gender equality. 
This narrow view based only on the rights afforded to men versus women should in 
no way discount the existence of oppression or disadvantages based on other 
categorizations such as race or gender identity. Those considerations, however, are 
beyond the scope of this Comment.  
 2. Equal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/equal?src=search-dict-hed (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (“of 
the same measure, quantity, amount, or number s another . . . like for each member of 
a group, class, or society.”). 
 3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
1
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treatment.4  A review of formal equality versus substantive equality illustrates 
how equal outcomes sometimes require unequal treatment.   
Formal equality has been explained in different ways but, at its core, it 
is the manifestation of “literal equality” – presuming that everyone should be 
afforded the same “rights, conditions, and opportunities” under the law.5  
Formal gender equality, therefore, would provide the same opportunities to 
men and women – regardless of their ability to act on it.6  Substantive equality, 
however, accounts for the inevitable inequalities manifested by providing 
equal opportunities to groups who will be unable to achieve equal outcomes.7  
Substantive gender equality recognizes that men and women have inherent 
differences that require different treatment and sometimes disproportionate 
opportunities to reach similar results.8  Therefore, substantive equality 
requires preferential treatment be given to the “historically disadvantaged 
class” when it lacks the ability to achieve an equal result on its own.9   
This Note explores different models of equality through the evolution of 
the American approach to formal equality in comparison with the South 
African approach to substantive equality.10  Part II of this Note surveys the 
expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment to sex discrimination and the 
constitutional development leading to South Africa’s equality protections.  
Part III then explores the recent discussion of an Equal Rights Amendment in 
America and the impact it would have on gender equality.  Subsequently, Part 
IV examines avenues for change and outlines implementation of a South 
African approach to better promote substantive gender equality in the United 
States.   
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK COMPARISON 
A. United States of America 
The United States is one of the world’s oldest democracies governed by 
one of the oldest constitutions,11 yet gender equality was not one of the 
 
 4. Equal opportunities do not always produce equal status because all people 
are differently abled. Differential treatment is sometimes necessary to ensure true 
equality. 
 5. HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 2 (2008); MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES 91 (2009). 
 6. IRVING, supra note 5, at 2. 
 7. Id.; KENDE, supra note 5, at 91. 
 8. “Formal equality can produce unequal results; where similar treatment is 
offered to persons who are not similarly situated, further disadvantage for the 
disadvantaged may be the outcome.” IRVING, supra note 5, at 2. 
 9. KENDE, supra note 5, at 91. 
 10. Id. at 9 (“[T]he Constitutional Court embraces ‘substantive equality’ as 
opposed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ‘formal equality.’”). 
 11. U. S. CONST.; KENDE, supra note 5, at 16. 
2
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fundamental rights contemplated for its citizens.12  The Equal Protection 
Clause has existed since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868.13  Although the Equal Protection Clause has ostensibly protected 
against discrimination on the basis of sex ever since,14 it was not applied in 
the context of sex discrimination until the 1970s.15  Even now, other than the 
Nineteenth Amendment which guarantees women the right to vote,16 the 
United States Constitution contains no express prohibition on sex 
discrimination.17 
1. Fourteenth Amendment 
Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment as one of three Civil War 
Amendments to protect the rights of newly freed slaves.18  The Equal 
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from 
passing or enforcing any laws that “deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”19  Section 5 of the amendment grants 
 
 12. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 725 (5th ed. 2017) (“The 
Constitution as originally drafted and ratified had no provisions assuring equal 
protection of the laws. This, of course, is not surprising for a document written for a 
society where blacks were enslaved and where women were routinely discriminated 
against.”).  
 13. Id. at 245, 754. 
 14. Throughout this Comment, “sex discrimination” will be used in place of 
“gender discrimination.” Gender discrimination encompasses issues of gender identity 
and expression which is too broad of a discussion for this Comment. Although “gender 
discrimination” is what is meant, “sex discrimination” is the legally proper way to say 
it. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used the term “gender discrimination” 
in her gender rights cases because her secretary at Columbia Law School warned her 
that the nine white haired men on the Supreme Court probably would not associate 
“sex discrimination” in its intended manner. Catherine Crocker, Ginsburg Explains 
Origin of Sex, Gender: Justice: Supreme Court’s Newest Member Speaks at Her Old 
Law School and Brings Down the House with Her History Lesson about Fighting Bias, 
L.A. TIMES, (Nov. 21, 1993), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-11-21-
mn-59217-story.html [https://perma.cc/543N-KEU3]. 
 15. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–683 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX 
 17. KENDE, supra note 5, at 101; U.S. CONST.  
 18. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 245, 754. (“After the Civil War, 
widespread discrimination against former slaves led to the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment…”); KENDE, supra note 5, 102.  See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 544 (1896) (“The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to 
enforce the absolute equality of the two races . . .”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 19. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
3
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Congress the power to enforce these provisions “by appropriate legislation,” 
however, it imposes no obligation on the government to do so.20  Indeed, the 
federal government’s role is one of remediating specific wrongs, not 
proactively trying to prevent them.21  For example, neither the abolition of 
slavery nor the Fourteenth Amendment were able to eliminate widespread 
discrimination and institutionalized inequalities against African Americans – 
segregation was propagated and legitimized throughout education, job 
opportunities, and public and private spheres well into the 1900s.22   
Although the Fourteenth Amendment was written to grant “any person” 
equal protections, these protections were not realized for decades.23  The 
Equal Protection Clause was intended to protect against racial discrimination 
and not to afford equality based on gender.24  Although protection against sex 
discrimination was not the focus of the legislature’s intent in passing the 
Fourteenth Amendment,25 the “Notorious” Ruth Bader Ginsburg developed a 
strategy for addressing the discriminatory effects of gender-biased statutes on 
women and men that eventually led the United States Supreme Court to 
constitutionalize the protection of sex discrimination under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.26  Ginsburg recognized that the distinction between racial 
discrimination and sex discrimination is that no innate difference exists 
between black and white beyond the color of one’s skin, where inherent 
biological differences exist between men and women.27   
 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis 
added). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  
 21. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (“Our country 
has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must 
ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current 
conditions.”); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–274, 
114 Stat. 804, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015). 
 22. See e.g. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  Racial discrimination 
is still a prominent issue in American society today, but the focus of this Comment is 
how equal protection applies to sex discrimination.  
 23. “[N]or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 24. As an example, women were denied the right to vote for over 50 years after 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 882; 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting women the right to vote). 
 25. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 759–60. 
 26. See e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Ruth Bader Ginsburg played a fundamental and 
historically valuable role in gender equality jurisprudence and her mentions 
throughout this Comment are in remembrance of some of the first great work she did 
during her time as an attorney and a Justice. 
 27. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Ginsburg wrote, “‘Inherent 
differences’ between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for 
4
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2. Equal Protection Common Law Development 
In 1971, the Supreme Court extended protections against sex 
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment to women for the first time 
in Reed v. Reed when they held an Idaho probate statute mandating preference 
to men over women violated the Equal Protection Clause.28  The statute 
required preference be given to male applicants in designation of estate 
administrators; thus, where a mother and father submitted competing 
applications with equal entitlement, the mother was denied based solely on 
her gender.29  The decision in Reed v. Reed established precedent that 
expanded Equal Protection beyond race, ushering in a new era of 
constitutional rights protections based on gender.   
After Reed, then-attorney Ginsburg began her famous crusade of sex 
discrimination cases in the Supreme Court with the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”).30  The first of these cases was Frontiero v. Richardson31 in 
which Justice Brennan articulated a compelling historical review of 
structurally imposed gender stereotypes in support of recognizing sex as a 
suspect class.32  Justice Powell, however, waived the issue of suspect 
 
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial 
constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) 
(referencing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). Likewise, Justice Brennan 
previously stated, “Sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth.” Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
686 (1973). See also KENDE, supra note 5, at 102. 
 28. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 29. Id. at 73.  
Few individuals have had such a dramatic and lasting effect on a particular area of law 
as Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who directed the work of the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project from its founding in 1972 until her appointment to the federal 
bench in 1980. During the 1970s, Ginsburg led the ACLU in a host of important legal 
battles many before the Supreme Court that established the foundation for the current 
legal prohibitions against sex discrimination in this country and helped lay the 
groundwork for future women’s rights advocacy. ACLU HISTORY: A DRIVING 
FORCE FOR CHANGE: THE ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-history-driving-force-change-aclu-womens-rights-
project (last accessed April 6, 2020). 
 31. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690–91 (holding a statute unconstitutional for 
imposing no burden on male servicemembers yet denying benefits to equally situated 
female servicemembers); The Court agreed that “classifications based upon sex, like 
classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect 
and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 682.) 
 32. Id. at 684–85 (“There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and 
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was 
rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put 
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage . . . As a result of notions such as these, our 
statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the 
sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our 
society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War 
5
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classification as an inquiry for the legislature in his concurrence – seemingly 
brushing off the constitutional significance of sex discrimination.33 
Although Ginsburg lost Kahn v. Shevin, the next case she argued in the 
Supreme Court, the majority’s reasoning seemed to be more closely aligning 
with the rationale for substantive equality.34  The Court’s reasoning for 
upholding the contested statute was that the “state tax law [was] reasonably 
designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of 
spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately 
heavy burden.”35  The statute gave exemptions from property taxes to widows 
but not widowers and thereby granted a benefit or an advantage to a previously 
disadvantaged group.36  Justice Brennan, wielding his majority opinion from 
Frontiero, maintained in his dissent that a classification based on a suspect 
class “must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.”37  Therefore, the Court 
was not “free to sustain the statute on the ground that it rationally promotes 
legitimate governmental interests.”38 
Following the loss in Kahn, Ginsburg received another favorable ruling 
in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld on a similar issue and continued to shift the 
Supreme Court’s approach to sex discrimination.39  Prior to this shift in 
 
slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit 
in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity 
to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children.”). 
 33. The concurrence mentioned the fact that Congress was considering the Equal 
Rights Amendment while this litigation was proceeding as reason to leave the issue of 
suspect classification to the legislature. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). While this 
may be a legitimate reason to defer this determination to another time, Powell’s 
statement that “democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in the restraint 
of the Court is impaired, when we appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of 
broad social and political importance at the very time they are under consideration 
within the prescribed constitutional processes” seems to be misled. Id. Categorizing 
sex discrimination against women as a “broad social and political” issue degrades 
women’s right to equal protection under the Constitution and perpetuates the idea that 
a woman’s status is something that must be determined based on what the social 
climate allows it to be and not as an individual citizen. Id. Not to mention – he ended 
up being wrong! He assumed the ERA was about to pass so why wade into the 
controversy… 
 34. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355–56 (1974) (upholding a statute that only 
provided widows property tax exemption but denied it to widowers). This statute 
facially discriminated against men (widowers), but the Supreme Court upheld the 
statute as valid because the differentiation had a “fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation.” Id. at 352 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). 
35. Id. at 355. 
 36. Id. at 355.Women in general make up the previously disadvantaged group 
here, however, it is specifically widows addressed in this case. 
 37. Id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (involving a differentiation 
in awarding Social Security Act benefits based on status as a widower). The Act 
provided benefits to widows and their minor children based on the prior earnings of 
6
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constitutional jurisprudence, sex discrimination was only considered under 
rational basis review, the minimum level of scrutiny.40  When Ginsburg and 
the ACLU began arguing for strict scrutiny in sex discrimination cases, the 
Supreme Court struggled to decide whether gender was a suspect class.41  The 
Court refused to recognize gender as a suspect class, but eventually deemed a 
heightened level of scrutiny appropriate for sex discrimination.42  The Court 
applied an intermediate scrutiny test requiring the government to show that 
the law was substantially related to a legitimate state objective for the first 
time in Craig v. Boren.43  Although racial discrimination is subjected to a 
higher level of scrutiny that requires the government to show the law is 
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest,”44 this was 
still a monumental shift in gender equality jurisprudence. 
3. Levels of Scrutiny 
In the United States, the foundation of equal protection cases relies on 
whether the “government’s classification [is] justified by a sufficient 
 
their deceased husbands yet only provided benefits to the minor children of widowers 
based on their deceased wife’s earning and failed to provide any benefits to the 
widowers themselves. Id. at 637–38.  Despite widowers restricted access to the same 
benefits as widows, the Court’s rationale for holding differentiation in the Act 
unconstitutional was based on the discriminatory effect on “female wage earners by 
affording the less protection for their survivors than is provided to male employees.” 
Id. at 638. 
 40. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (“The question presented by this case, 
then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of 
administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective.”). See infra Part II.A.3. 
 41. “I continue to adhere to my view that ‘classifications based upon sex, like 
classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, 
and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.’” Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484, 501 (1974) (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Frontiero 
v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973)), superseded by statute, Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–55, 92 Stat. 2076. See also Reed, 404 U.S. 
at 76 (“The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of 
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a 
state objective.”). See infra Part II.A.3. 
 42. See Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny 
to sex discrimination for the first time). See infra Part II.A.3. 
 43. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (applying intermediate scrutiny to sex discrimination 
for the first time) (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
This case involved an Oklahoma statute allowing alcohol sales to women over the age 
of 18 but only to men over the age of 21. Id. at 192. Although this case is not 
necessarily recognized as a noteworthy sex discrimination case where alcohol sales 
are clearly not as fundamental as equal job opportunities, the impact of this case was 
important for sex discrimination jurisprudence.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 44. KENDE, supra note 5, at 102. See infra Part II.A.3. 
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purpose.”45  However, different types of discrimination are not afforded the 
same depth of analysis.46  Courts determine which level of scrutiny to apply 
based on the identified classification being made: rational basis review, 
intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.47  To determine whether the 
government is distinguishing between groups of people, the Court has allowed 
two ways to establish a classification is being drawn: “where the classification 
exists on the face of the law” or where the law is “facially neutral, but there is 
a discriminatory impact” or effect.48  The Supreme Court has specified that a 
showing of discriminatory impact or effect is “insufficient” to prove a 
classification based on sex.49  Rather, to prove a facially neutral law has a 
discriminatory impact or effect based on sex, there must be proof of a 
discriminatory purpose behind the law.50  Once the classification has been 
identified, the analysis proceeds to determine the level of scrutiny.51  
Strict scrutiny is reserved for the discrimination against suspect 
classifications that have been deemed most crucial to protect – namely, 
classifications like race and national origin.52  For a law to be upheld under 
strict scrutiny, the government must prove a compelling interest or purpose 
for the discrimination and that the objective could not be achieved through 
“any less discriminatory alternative.”53  Rational basis review, on the other 
hand, is the bare minimum that every challenged classification must meet.54  
A classification will be upheld under rational basis as long as the government 
can show that it is “something that the government legitimately may do” and 
that their chosen action is a “rational way to accomplish the end.”55  
 
 45. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 726. 
 46. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 726. (“[S]ufficient justification depends 
entirely on the type of discrimination.”). However, in South Africa, the “stringency of 
scrutiny of the offending discrimination is to be no less in the one case than in the 
other.” PENELOPE ANDREWS, FROM CAPE TOWN TO KABUL: RETHINKING STRATEGIES 
FOR PURSUING WOMEN’S HUMANS RIGHTS 105–06 (2012). 
 47. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 727 (“Once the classification is identified, 
the next step in analysis is to identify the level of scrutiny to be applied. The Supreme 
Court has made it clear that differing levels of scrutiny will be applied depending on 
the type of discrimination.”). 
 48. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 726–27 (“For instance, a law that requires 
that all police officers be at least 510” tall and 150 pounds is, on its face, only a height 
and weight classification. Statistics, however, show that over 40 percent of men but 
only 2 percent of women will meet this requirement. The result is that the law has a 
discriminatory impact against women in hiring for the police force.”). 
 49. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 727 (5th ed. 2017) (“Thus, 
women challenging the height and weight requirements for the police force must show 
that the government’s purpose was to discriminate based on gender.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). 
 51. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 727. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 728. 
 55. Id. 
8
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Intermediate scrutiny, however, is a middle ground between these two levels 
of scrutiny.56  
Intermediate scrutiny is the analysis applied to classifications based on 
gender.57  The difference between strict and intermediate scrutiny is that the 
latter only requires a law to be “substantially related to an important 
government purpose,” rather than a “compelling” one.58  This distinction 
seems to be without much difference – if anything, it is more a difference in 
utterance than a clear difference in application.59  Even in practice, the courts 
appear to apply a sliding scale test for scrutiny.60  Intermediate scrutiny itself 
is just a lowered standard of strict scrutiny, yet the courts even apply varying 
levels of “heightened intermediate scrutiny.”61  This level of scrutiny seems 
to be a special gray area carved out for sex discrimination so the courts didn’t 
have to deal with the issues related to fitting gender into either of the other 
groups.62  Experts in sex discrimination argue that rational basis is clearly too 
low for discrimination of this kind because it is overwhelmingly “deferential 
to the government” and would, therefore, allow almost all challenged 
classifications based on sex to stand.63  Where rational basis would allow sex 
discrimination to remain, strict scrutiny in this context would be a road block 
to protections and further reform in areas where the sexes are differently 
abled.  While strict scrutiny may seem most favorable to those who support 
gender rights and gender equality, there is a legitimate reason why this higher 
standard has not been applied in sex discrimination cases.64  
Despite not originally including gender equality in the Constitution, 
American gender equality jurisprudence was developed over time by 
establishing precedent for sex discrimination scrutiny through the Equal 
 
 56. Id. at 727. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
 59. Important interests versus compelling interests could easily be interpreted 
subjectively. 
 60. “Some critics suggest that although the Court speaks in terms of three tiers of 
review, in reality there is a spectrum of standards of review . . . the reality is a range 
of standards.” 
 61. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 729 (“It is argued that in some cases 
intermediate scrutiny is applied in a very deferential manner that is essentially rational 
basis review, while in other cases intermediate scrutiny seems indistinguishable from 
strict scrutiny.”).  
 62. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, 
at 728–29 (“[T]he Court’s use of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications 
reflects its view that the biological differences between men and women mean that 
there are more likely to be instances where sex is a justifiable basis for 
discrimination.”). 
 63. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 728 n.9 (“Once the classification is 
identified, the next step in analysis is to identify the level of scrutiny to be applied. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that differing levels of scrutiny will be applied 
depending on the type of discrimination.”). 
 64. See infra Section IV.A. 
9
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Protection Clause.65  The South African Constitution, however, explicitly 
provides protection against sex discrimination while still allowing advantages 
to previously disadvantaged groups to promote equal outcome.66 
B. South Africa  
Like in the United States, the South African Constitution was developed 
over a period fraught with racial injustices and legalized discrimination.67  
Early British colonists brought with them beliefs of black inferiority that 
enhanced racism in South Africa for years to come and planted the seeds that 
nurtured the apartheid regime.68  After apartheid was institutionalized in 
1948,69 racial discrimination was further legitimized through strict 
“segregation and denial of political rights on the basis of race”70 such as 
requiring blacks to carry special identification and restricting where they 
could work, live, and travel.71  This deeply institutionalized segregation 
essentially stripped black South Africans of their equality and citizenship.  
When leaders like Nelson Mandela spoke out and fought with the African 
National Congress (“ANC”)72 against apartheid, these clashing political 
ideologies pushed the nation to the brink of a civil war.73  
 
 65. See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 66. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 9. Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution 
is their Bill of Rights. 
 67. “South Africa acknowledges through its Constitution, that constitutional 
adjudication occurs against a background of disadvantage and discrimination that are 
deeply embedded in the political, economic, and legal systems.” ANDREWS, supra note 
45, at 26. 
 68. KENDE, supra note 5, at 18–20.  Apartheid was a “powerful, wealthy, and 
racist [] regime” implemented by the white minority in South Africa that overtook the 
black majority through forced segregation and disenfranchisement through political 
and military force. KENDE, supra note 5, at 1. 
 69. KENDE, supra note 5, at 23.   
 70. ROBERT. L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 396 (3d ed. 2008). 
 71. Erin Blakemore,  The Harsh Reality of Life Under Apartheid in South Africa, 
HISTORY, (May 9, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/apartheid-policies-photos-
nelson-mandela [https://perma.cc/764Q-CKGB]. 
 72. The ANC drafted a Freedom Charter in 1955 that influenced the final South 
African Constitution. Nelson Mandela, Freedom in our Lifetime, (June 30, 1956), 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/freedom-our-lifetime-nelson-mandela 
[https://perma.cc/PLT3-XFHD].  This Freedom Charter was issued just after the 
Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 
483 (1954); KENDE, supra note 5, at 24. 
 73. MADDEX, supra note 69, at 396. 
KENDE, supra note 5, at 23–28. 
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1. Fight for Democracy 
During the Cold War and as opposition against the apartheid government 
grew, ANC leaders and political activists were labeled as Communists by 
apartheid supporters, mercilessly pursued, and imprisoned for their 
opposition.74  Although prominent anti-apartheid leaders were imprisoned, 
their beliefs and their followers were not silenced.  While imprisoned, leaders 
like Mandela corresponded with South African officials and ANC activists 
who continued pushing for a new democratic South Africa.75  Support for the 
ANC eventually increased and international pressures on the South African 
government became impossible to ignore.76  In 1990, the political prisoners 
were freed, the ban on political parties was lifted, and negotiations were able 
to commence for establishing a democratic South Africa.77  
When South Africa began transforming itself into a democratic republic, 
it was clear that racial discrimination would be prohibited, and their new 
nation would guarantee rights to all citizens that had previously been denied 
to a majority of South Africans.  It was insisted that the people reset as 
“citizens of a new, free, united and democratic South Africa, and not base 
[their] structures of government on race or ethnicity.”78  The ANC was 
advantaged with access to diverse world views and the “ANC people [that] 
had lived in all continents and had experienced firsthand the pluses and 
minuses of just about every form of government in the world” aided 
democratic reform with their experiential knowledge and ideas.79  During the 
constitutional drafting period widespread opinion was constantly sought 
beyond the ANC’s own experience such as holding workshops at the 
University of Western Cape.80  The conception of this nation-altering 
document was so crucial that extensive preparations were made before 
negotiations on the drafting of the document even began.81 
The drafting process for a new Constitution was a meticulous transition 
where equality was vital not just to the final product and its prescribed 
 
 74. KENDE, supra note 5, at 26–27. This is how Nelson Mandela ended up in the 
infamous Robben Island prison where he spent two decades before becoming South 
Africa’s first democratic president. 27. 
 75. KENDE, supra note 5, at 30. 
 76. Id. at 27, 29. 
 77. Id. at 30. 
 78. ALBIE SACHS, OLIVER TAMBO’S DREAM 27 (2017). 
 79. Id. at 30. 
 80. Id. at 33. “These workshops dealt with matters such as whether to have a 
Constitutional Court, the electoral system, the regions, socio and economic rights, and 
affirmative action.” SACHS, supra note 77, at 34. 
 81. “South Africa had a two-stage drafting process. First, elites from the various 
groups established a transitional framework that developed power to democratic 
institutions. These institutions then made the crucial second-stage decisions.” KENDE, 
supra note 5, at 32. 
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guarantees but to the crafting process itself.82  Negotiations commenced 
between the various political parties in South Africa in what was known as 
the “Multi-Party Negotiating Process” (“MPNP”) where they adopted the 34 
Constitutional Principles83 that would guide the drafting of the Constitution 
and, likewise, drafted an Interim Constitution84 to govern the nation over the 
two years allotted until the final Constitution would be finalized and 
enacted.85  This process alone lasted several months and persisted through 
constant violence and acts of terror intended to prevent negotiations from 
continuing.86  The Interim Constitution laid the groundwork for how the 
government was to be structured, including the highest court in South Africa, 
the Constitutional Court,87 which was to ensure that the 34 Constitutional 
Principles were fulfilled by the final Constitution.88  
 
 82. The ANC wanted to “agree in advance to certain basic principles of 
democracy” and fought to establish “elections by proportional representation to make 
sure that everybody [could] get into the Parliament that [drew] up the Constitution.” 
The idea of having an “independent Constitutional Court to ensure that the principles 
[were] agreed to” was vital to this process. SACHS, supra note 77, at 38; “The full 
participation of women in the transitional and electoral structures and processes, laid 
the groundwork of the new constitution and government” and allowed those 
participating “early on to debate and resist objections to having a constitution with 
strong protections for women’s rights” as well as “to help determine exactly what 
those rights would be.” ANDREWS, supra note 45, at 103. 
 83. The purpose of the 34 Constitutional Principles was to outline what a newly 
created constitution should embody. The 34 Constitutional Principles, 
CONSTITUTIONHILL, https://ourconstitution.constitutionhill.org.za/the-34-
constitutional-principles/ [https://perma.cc/6MYP-FEXB] (last visited May 10, 2021). 
The principles provided a detailed map for structuring a government, the powers it 
would be given, and the rights that all persons should be afforded. Id. It was agreed 
and established that the Constitutional Court would be unable to certify the 
Constitution if it failed to follow the guidelines set forth in the 34 Constitutional 
Principles. The Drafting and Acceptance of the Constitution, SOUTH AFRICAN 
HISTORY ONLINE, https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/drafting-and-acceptance-
constitution [https://perma.cc/8R2F-HCQ2] (last visited May 10, 2021). 
 84. “The 1993 Interim Constitution became fairly detailed because it had to 
potentially govern the country from 1994 elections until enactment of a final 
Constitution.” KENDE, supra note 5, at 33.. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993. 
 85. “The Constitutional Assembly had two years to write a final constitution 
which had to pass by a two-thirds majority. The Constitutional Assembly, or 
Parliament, would be made up of the National Assembly and a Senate that represented 
the provinces.” KENDE, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
 86. SACHS, supra note 77, at 39. 
 87. The Constitutional Court is the South African equivalent of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. It is the highest court in the South African judicial system 
and has the final decisions to confirm orders of the lower courts. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 
Ch. 8, §§ 166–67.  
 88. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993; KENDE, supra note 5, at 34(“A new 
Constitutional Court would also have to ‘certify’ that the Constitution fulfilled the 34 
Constitutional Principles.”). 
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While the next two years between the drafting of the Interim Constitution 
and the Constitution were extremely difficult, the circumstances under which 
South Africa’s final Constitution was drafted were remarkable.  The newly 
established Constitutional Court89 even refused to certify the first draft of the 
Constitution because it failed to meet the 34 Constitutional Principles 
determined in negotiations.90  This act not only established the power of 
judicial review in South Africa in practice, 91 but it embodied the nation’s 
dedication to crafting a transformative document focused on human rights.92  
The importance of equality in the drafting process survived the tensions 
between political parties – both genders and various races were represented in 
the decision making, and public input was encouraged and considered.93   
 
 89. Consisting of a “Chief Justice of South Africa, the Deputy Chief Justice and 
nine other judges” who are responsible for deciding constitutional matters “involving 
the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution.” S. AFR. CONST. 1996 
Ch. 8, § 167.  
 90. KENDE, supra note 5, at 37. The amended draft was approved. 
 91. (1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.   
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which 
they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. 
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts. 
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the 
courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness 
of the courts. 
(5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of 
state to which it applies. 
(6) The Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary and exercises responsibility over the 
establishment and monitoring of norms and standards for the exercise of the judicial 
functions of all courts.  
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 Ch. 8, § 165. 
 92. The Founding Provisions of the South African Constitution state that this 
“one, sovereign, democratic state [was] founded” on the values of: “(a) Human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms. [and] (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.” S. AFR. CONST. 196 Ch. 1, § 1. 
 93. KENDE, supra note 5, at 35 (“To its credit, the Constitutional Assembly 
solicited public participation by innovative means and this input resulted in some 
change.”). The United States Constitution was written under such different 
circumstances than the South African Constitution. In the United States, the 
Constitution was drafted by slaveowners who were inclined to keep the current power 
structure in place. Whereas, in South Africa, the Constitution was written after the 
racist Apartheid regime was destroyed and they designed a living document that would 
prevent a similar system from ever resurfacing. “To assist with its implementation, the 
South African Constitution established several government agencies including a 
Human Rights Commission and a Commission on Gender Equality. It also established 
a Truth & Reconciliation Commission that was supposed to facilitate national healing. 
There are no similar government agencies to guide the implementation of the U.S. 
Constitution.” KENDE, supra note 5, at 7. The Supreme Court has the sole 
responsibility for deciding if the laws of the land are adhering to the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court has the final say in American Constitutional analysis. While it is 
important to ensure that the Constitution is not applied based on individual citizens’ 
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Although the majority of injustices in South Africa’s past were 
motivated by race, its Constitution fervently protects against discrimination in 
many forms, including gender.94  Constitutional Court Justice Richard 
Goldstone95 explained why equality guarantees in South Africa are so 
fundamental:  
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a 
recognition that the purpose of [South Africa’s] new constitutional and 
democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human 
beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their 
membership of particular groups.96  
South Africa created a comprehensive Bill of Rights that guarantees 
rights protections not just to South African citizens but to “all people in” 
South Africa.97  The South African Constitution explicitly directs the 
Constitutional Court on how to interpret the Bill of Rights.98  Chapter 2 § 9, 
the Equality Provision, of the South African Bill of Rights provides specific 
protections against sex discrimination: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories 
of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
 
interpretations of the Constitution, having government agencies that assist in guiding 
legislation that upholds the changing political and social culture of this country would 
give people more power and more say (which is important for eliminating gender 
stereotypes), whereas a single Court may be more apt to uphold the outdated intentions 
of the original framers. 
 94. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Ch. 2, § 9. 
 95. Justice Goldstone served as a judge on the first Constitutional Court from 
July 1994 to October 2003. Justice Richard Goldstone, CONST. CT. S. AFR., 
https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/judges/former-judges/11-former-judges/58-
justice-richard-goldstone (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 96. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo, 1997 SACLR 
LEXIS 91, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) at para. 41. 
 97. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Ch. 2, § 7(1) (emphasis added). This includes travelers 
and refugees. 
 98. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 39 (“(I) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal, or forum—(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom; (b) must consider international 
law; and (c) may consider foreign law.”). The United States Constitution, however, 
provides no directives on how the Supreme Court should interpret and apply the 
Constitution. Scholars have suggested that this lack of instruction is responsible for 
the divide between living constitutionalists and originalists. 
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(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National 
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection 
(3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.99 
 
Unlike the United States Constitution, the South African Constitution 
does explicitly prohibit sex discrimination which required less case law to 
develop the legal framework for gender equality in South Africa than was 
necessary in the United States.100  Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of cases involving sex discrimination is still an important tool 
for shaping how the Bill of Rights is applied in practice to the people in South 
Africa. 
2. Equality Provision 
A textual analysis of Chapter 2 § 9 provides some interesting distinctions 
between how South African law evaluates discrimination versus American 
law.  Subsection 2 of the Equality provision provides for “legislative and other 
measures” to authorize affirmative action.101  This means that the South 
African Constitution explicitly allows legislative action to provide advantages 
to groups of previously disadvantaged people, while disallowing that same 
advantage to groups who had previously retained an advantage over others.102  
This subsection provides an opportunity for the legislature to act in 
accordance with protecting against discrimination, whereas subsections 3 and 
4 focus on how the state is likewise restricted in acting.103  These subsections 
 
 99. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 9.The South African constitution was the first 
constitution to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
MADDEX, supra note 69, at 396. The inclusive nature of the South African Bill of 
Rights mirrors the perspective of Oliver Tambo, “You protect people from abuse not 
because they’re black, not because they’re white, not because they’re in the majority, 
not because they’re in the minority, but because they’re human beings.” SACHS, supra 
note 77, at 27. 
 100. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Ch. 2, § 9. 
 101. Id. at§ 9(2); KENDE, supra note 5, at 112. 
 102. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Ch. 2, § 9(2); KENDE, supra note 5, at 112. 
 103. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Ch. 2,  § 9(3)–(4). 
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restrict discrimination by the state and private persons.104  Whereas the United 
States can only regulate state discrimination by applying the Commerce 
Clause, the South African Constitution specifically grants the power to 
regulate state discrimination alongside the private actions of individuals.105  
Beyond regulating those responsible for discrimination, subsections 3 
and 4 in the Equality provision are especially important because they list the 
protected classes and illustrate the importance of distinguishing between fair 
and unfair discrimination.106  All of the protected grounds listed are given the 
same level of importance – the distinction is in establishing if the 
discrimination is fair on a case-by-case basis.  Yet, these subsections fail to 
provide much explanation as to what constitutes fair versus unfair 
discrimination.107  Subsection 4, however, does specify that the prohibition of 
discrimination extends to both direct and indirect discrimination.108  
Subsection 5 specifies that “discrimination on one or more of the grounds” 
protected under the Equality provision is unfair – “unless it is established that 
the discrimination is fair.”109  This explanation seems to be contradictory and, 
at the very least, lacks clear direction for those who are ultimately responsible 
for enacting protections against discrimination.  Although somewhat lacking 
in guidance, the South African Equality provision provides the courts with the 
opportunity to determine what is fair or unfair discrimination.110  
3. Fairness Determinations 
One of the first cases heard by the Constitutional Court discussing 
equality under the Constitution was President of South Africa v. Hugo.111  
Several years after becoming the first President of South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela issued a pardon for all incarcerated women with children under the 
age of twelve who had committed nonviolent offenses.112  Although this 
pardon seemed facially discriminatory against the pardoned inmates’ male 
counterparts, Mandela’s rationale for this decision was to promote and support 
the importance of the maternal influence in early stages of development.113  
The Court determined that this facial discrimination against men was not 
 
 104. Id.  
 105. See e.g. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 106. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Ch. 2, § 9(4). 
 107. Id. at § 9(3)–(4). 
 108. Id. at § 9(4). 
 109. Id. at § 9(5). 
 110. Id. at § 9. 
 111. President of South Africa and Another v. Hugo, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 91, (6) 
BCLR 708 (CC). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; KENDE, supra note 5, at 117.  
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“unfair” and, therefore, Mandela’s pardon passed the unfair discrimination 
test and was allowed to stand as constitutional.114  
Lacking any clear guidance on how to approach the determination of 
whether the discrimination was unfair, the Court applied the steps laid out in 
§ 9 of the Constitution.115  Justice Goldstone further explained that equality is 
not always realized through “identical treatment in all circumstances” and the 
unfair discrimination analysis should recognize that.116  With substantive 
equality and freedom in mind, Goldstone suggested that “each case, therefore, 
will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine 
whether its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of 
equality or not.”117  Justice Johann Kriegler’s dissent in Hugo, however, 
expressed his preparedness “to accept without deciding, that in very narrow 
circumstances a generalization – although reflecting a discriminatory reality 
– could be vindicated if its ultimate implications were equalizing.”118  Kriegler 
outlined the two criteria he believed should be met if a discriminatory 
generalization were to be justified in the interests of equality: (1) a “strong 
indication that the advantages flowing from the perpetuation of a stereotype 
compensate for obvious and profoundly troubling disadvantages;” and (2) 
“the context would have to be one in which discriminatory benefits were 
apposite.”119 
4. The Harksen Test 
Following Hugo, the Constitutional Court in Harksen v. Lane fleshed out 
a four-part test for determining whether discrimination was unfair in a housing 
discrimination case.120  The Harksen test established a rational basis test 
 
 114. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v. Hugo, 1997 SACLR 
LEXIS 91, (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 
 115. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 9. 
 116. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo, 1997 SACLR 
LEXIS 91, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) (“We need, therefore, to develop a concept of 
unfair discrimination which recognises that although a society which affords each 
human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we 
cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances 
before that goal is achieved.”). 
 117. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo, 1997 SACLR 
LEXIS 91, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) at para. 41. Goldstone further explained that “a 
classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different 
context.” Id. 
 118. Id. at para. 82 (Kriegler, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. “True as it may be that our society currently exhibits deeply entrenched 
patterns of inequality, these cannot justify a perpetuation of inequality. A statute or 
conduct that presupposes these patterns is unlikely to be vindicated by relying on 
them. One that not only presupposes them but is likely to promote their continuation, 
is even less likely to pass muster.” Id. at para. 77. 
 120. Harksen v. Lane NO and others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC).  
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similar to the lowest level of scrutiny in the United States.  Although these 
cases were heard while the Interim Constitution was in place, the test remains 
the same as applied to the equality protections in the current South African 
Constitution.121  The necessary consideration in the Harksen test can be 
articulated as follows: (1) Does the law differentiate? (2) If so, is the 
differentiation done for a legitimate reason? (3) Is the differentiation 
discrimination? and (4) Is the discrimination unfair?122 
The first step of the Harksen test requires a determination as to whether 
the law differentiates between groups of people on its face.123  This 
determination can be as simple as in Hugo where the pardon was only for 
women which clearly differentiated between men and women.124  Even if the 
differentiation is not glaringly obvious, there will typically be a creative 
argument as to how the law in question is differentiating between groups of 
people in its effect.  While there may be no merit to an overconfidently crafted 
claim, it may make it past the first step only to be shot down in the final 
inquiries.  
Like the constitutional scrutiny analysis in American jurisprudence, the 
second step to determining whether a law is discriminatory requires a 
rationality test to decide if the differentiation was done for a legitimate 
reason.125  If the differentiation serves no purpose and is not rationally 
connected to some legitimate objective, then the discrimination presumption 
is strengthened.  Yet, if the party responsible for differentiating can prove that 
a rational connection between the differentiation and its purpose exists 
without discrimination then the differentiation is deemed to be fair.126  
However, even if the rational connection exists, the differentiation may still 
be found to be discrimination and the fairness determination must be made.   
The third step in the Harksen test can be determined simultaneously with 
the second step.  The third inquiry asks the court simply to determine if the 
differentiation is based on one of the listed grounds in § 9(3).127  If the 
differentiation is based on one of the protected categories, then it is 
discrimination.128  If the differentiation is discrimination, then the court must 
determine if the discrimination was unfair regardless of the connection to a 
legitimate purpose.129  The final step in the Harksen test is to determine 
 
 121. S. AFR. CONST.; S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993; KENDE, supra note 5, at 96. 
 122. Harksen v. Lane NO and others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC).  
 123. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Ch. 2, § 9(3); KENDE, supra note 5, at 95–96. 
 124. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo, 1997 SACLR 
LEXIS 91, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 
 125. Harksen v. Lane NO and others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); KENDE, supra 
note 5, at 95–96 (“The law must draw a rational differentiation to be minimally 
acceptable.”). 
 126. Harksen v. Lane NO and others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) at 1491–92, 
1511–12. 
 127. KENDE, supra note 5, at 96. 
 128. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 9(3); KENDE, supra note 5, at 96. 
 129. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2,§ 9. 
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whether the discrimination is unfair by analyzing the impact on the parties 
being discriminated against.130  Textually, § 9(5) explains that discrimination 
on a listed ground is presumed unfair until established otherwise.131  However, 
unfair discrimination can be justified depending on the proportionality 
between the unfair impact of the discrimination and the public interest.132  The 
level of “fairness” is dependent on the impact of the discrimination.133  “Fair” 
discrimination is subject to a “rationality review” as determined by § 9(1); 
whereas, “unfair” discrimination is subject to a “reasonableness review” as 
determined by § 9(3) in conjunction with § 36.134 
5. Jordan v. State 
Although the South African Constitution allows for legislative measures 
such as affirmative action to effectuate equality between groups that have 
historically received disparate treatment, the Constitutional Court has not 
always agreed on which circumstances may elicit an advantage.  Similarly, 
since the Court has a generous amount of discretion in determining whether 
discrimination is unfair, it has not consistently applied the principle of unfair 
discrimination in equality cases.  In one such case, the Court in Jordan v. State 
was divided six-to-five on the issue of equality, yet the majority decision 
seemed to deviate from the Court’s previous devotion to reconstructing the 
balance between previously unequal groups.135  The issue in Jordan was a law 
prohibiting prostitution that failed to allow prosecutors to charge the 
clientele.136  The reason this law was challenged under the equality clause was 
due to the alleged disparate impact the law had on women.137   
 
 130. Id. 
 131. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2,§ 9(5). 
 132. Baker McKenzie, The Meaning of Unfair Discrimination in South Africa – 
Part II, LEXOLOGY, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e12acb7b-d909-
4ff5-9668-960776664e5f [https://perma.cc/8ZJW-K4HB]. 
 133. Id.; Harksen v. Lane NO and others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 
 134.  
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law 
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including – (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose 
of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the 
relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) 
or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.   
S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, §36. 
 135. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC); KENDE, supra note 5, at 117–18. 
 136. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC); KENDE, supra note 5, at 117.  
 137. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC); KENDE, supra note 5, at 117–18. 
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The majority in Jordan reasoned that this law was “gender neutral” 
because it “punishes both female and male prostitutes.”138  The dissenting 
judges disagreed because the practical application of the law was 
disproportionately affecting women where the majority of prostitutes were 
overwhelmingly female and the clientele was overwhelmingly male.139  
Justices O’Regan and Sachs argued that “the effect of making the prostitute 
the primary offender directly reinforces a pattern of sexual stereotyping which 
is itself in conflict with the principle of gender equality.”140  O’Regan and 
Sachs claimed this pattern of sexual stereotyping reinforced the view of the 
female prostitute as the “fallen” whore where the male client was “at best 
virile, at worst weak.”141  The dissent further reflected that the “differential 
impact between prostitute and client [was] therefore directly linked to a 
pattern of gender disadvantage which [the South African] Constitution is 
committed to eradicating.”142 
This Harksen test does not protect against all discrimination as it should 
and § 9 equips the Constitutional Court with wide discretion in determining 
whether discrimination is unfair, but change must start somewhere.  The South 
African Constitution is structured to protect human rights and human dignity 
in a way that protects equality through equal outcomes.  Differential treatment 
and inequality will not be changed overnight, but  the South African 
Constitution has provided an avenue to enact the shift towards substantive 
equality.  Although the United States Constitution is not as generous in its 
equality protections, the American mindset is shifting and slowly beginning 
to acknowledge the disparate impact of equal opportunities versus equal 
 
 138. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at 9 para.15 (emphasis added); KENDE, 
supra note 5, at 118. 
 139. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at 35 para. 59; KENDE, supra note 5, at 
119. 
 140. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at 36–37 para. 60; KENDE, supra note 
5, at 119. 
 141. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at 39 para. 65; KENDE, supra note 5, at 
119. 
 142. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at 35 para. 60; KENDE, supra note 5, at 
119. The alternative approach offered by the dissent to remedy this differential impact 
was to expand the law to impose liability on both the prostitute and clientele to 
effectuate stronger deterrence. Jordan v. State 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at 65 para. 96; 
KENDE, supra note 5, at 120. Several years after the Jordan decision, the Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters Amendment established liability for those persons who 
“unlawfully and intentionally engages the [sexual] services of a person 18 years or 
older.” Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act Section No 32, 2007 
ch. 2 part 3 (“(1) A person (“A”) who unlawfully and intentionally engages the 
services of a person 18 years or older (“B”) , for financial and other reward, favour or 
compensation to B or to a third person (“C”) – for the purpose of engaging in a sexual 
act with B, irrespective of whether the sexual act is committed or not: or by 
committing a sexual act with B, is guilty of engaging the sexual services of a person 
18 years or older.”). This legislation imposes liability on sex workers’ clientele, 
effectively remedying the issues the dissent so strongly emphasized in Jordan. KENDE, 
supra note 5, at 121. 
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outcomes on disadvantaged groups.  One prominent shift has been discussion 
on a Constitutional amendment guaranteeing equal rights based on sex. 
III. EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 
During the decade of prominent attacks on sex discrimination in the 
1970s, Congress considered an Equality Rights Amendment (“ERA”) to be 
added to the Constitution: 
SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. 
SEC[TION] 2 The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
SEC[TION] 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date 
of ratification.143  
This amendment was successfully brought to Congress by Michigan 
Congresswoman Martha Griffiths who introduced the ERA on the House floor 
every year from 1955 to 1970 when it passed the House for the first time.144  
The ERA did not pass the Senate in 1970 – it was not until 1972 that the ERA 
passed both the House and the Senate sending the amendment to be ratified 
by the states.145  The Ninety-Second Congress set a time limit on the 
amendment for ratification – even extending it once – yet the states failed to 
fulfill the three-quarters requirement for ratification.146  Although the deadline 
for ratification had passed, Virginia became the thirty-eighth state to vote to 
ratify this amendment in August of 2019.147  
The deadline imposed by the Ninety-Second Congress was a roadblock 
for ratification until it regained attention in the House in early 2019.  The ERA 
was reintroduced in the House on January 29, 2019.148  The next day, on 
January 30, 2019, Congress introduced House Joint Resolution 38 to remove 
the deadline imposed by the Ninety-Second Congress to allow ratification of 
 
 143. H.R.J.  Res. 208, 92d Cong., (2d Sess. 1972). 
 144. Tara Law, Virginia Just Became the 38th State to Pass the Equal Rights 
Amendment. Here’s What to Know About the History of the ERA, TIME, (Jan. 15, 
2020), https://time.com/5657997/equal-rights-amendment-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/N2T5-93EQ]; UNITED STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
GRIFFITHS, Martha Wright, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/14160 [https://perma.cc/SNV4-HU5G] (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2021). 
145. Law, supra note 144. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
 148. H.R.J. 35, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019). The Senate also reintroduced the 
ERA on March 27, 2019. S.J. Res. 15 , 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019). 
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the ERA when the three-quarters requirement had been met.149  This 
resolution, however, never passed the House and was reintroduced again in 
November 2019.150  Finally, on February 13, 2020, the House passed the 
resolution to remove the deadline for ratification and referred it to the Senate 
the same day.151  The outlook for this resolution in the Senate did not look 
promising, especially if Republican Senator Mitch McConnell remains the 
Senate Majority leader following the 2020 election.152  
Democrats appeared to be taking an equality and inclusion stance on this 
amendment.  House Speaker Nancy Pelosi stated, “The ERA will strengthen 
America, unleashing the full power of women in our economy and upholding 
the value of equality in our democracy.”153  Legal experts have bolstered the 
validity of this equality stance by arguing that this amendment “could protect 
women economically” by substantiating “equal pay and preventing pregnancy 
 
 149. H.R.J. 38, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).   
 150. H.R.J. 79, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019). 
 151. H.R.J. 79, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020). The resolution passed by a 232 to 
183 vote. 166 CONG. REC. H30, 1129–43 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2020). These votes were 
almost narrowly divided on party lines with 227 democrats voting yes and 182 
republicans voting no. Five republicans voted yes, but none of the democrats voted 
against the amendment. The only democrats not to vote in favor were the 10 who did 
not participate in the vote. FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 70, OFF. OF THE 
CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, (Feb 13, 2020), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2020/roll070.xml; Danielle Kurtzleben, House Votes To 
Revive Equal Rights Amendment, Removing Ratification Deadline, NPR, (Feb. 13, 
2020 12:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13/805647054/house-votes-to-revive-
equal-rights-amendment-removing-ratification-deadline. 
 152. This is due to the party line division on this issue and the Republican majority 
in the 116th Senate. Party Division, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (last accessed April 1, 2020).  The 
Senate is projected to retain the Republican majority following the 2020 election, 
however, “party control of the Senate will [not] be decided [until] January” 2021 
following the two runoff elections in Georgia. U.S. Senate Election Results, WASH. 
POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/election-results/senate-2020 (last 
visited November 11, 2020). [https://perma.cc/4JW5-TDMF].  Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell was the main roadblock to passing this amendment in the 
Senate. Dustin Gardiner, McConnell, GOP Senate Hold Key to ERA Sex Bias Ban 
After House Revives Fight, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Equal-Rights-Amendment-to-ban-sex-
bias-wins-key-15053708.php.  Both “Mitch McConnell and Lindsay Graham are 
blocking action in the Senate and have both spoken out in opposition to the Equal 
Rights Amendment.” Jessica Neuwirth, It’s time for the Trump administration to drop 
fight against the Equal Rights Amendment, COURIER JOURNAL, Aug. 26, 2020, 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2020/08/26/equal-rights-amendment-
trump-administration-ties-up-era-litigation/3420678001/. 
 153. Kurtzleben, supra note 151. 
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discrimination.”154  Republicans, however, portrayed the fight for gender 
equality as a dramatic attack on anti-abortion laws.155   
Thirteen of the 197 Republican Representatives on the 116th Congress 
were women, and they were “heavily represented” among anti-abortion 
activists voting against the ERA.156  Debbie Lesko, a Republican from 
Arizona, opined that “If ratified, the ERA would be used by pro-abortion 
groups to undo pro-life legislation and lead to more abortions and taxpayer-
funded abortions.”157  Many female anti-abortionists seem to be missing the 
point that having a choice means being able to choose not to get an abortion 
as well, theirs and other’s beliefs on abortion are blurring the lines of the 
equality argument.   
After no further Congressional action on these resolutions, Nevada, 
Illinois, and Virginia sought a declaration in federal court that the amendment 
had been formally adopted.158  Judge Rudolph Contreras of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia ruled otherwise – stating that Virginia’s 
vote “came after both the original and extended deadlines that Congress 
attached to the ERA.”159  These states, however, announced on May 3, 2021 
their intentions to appeal this ruling and continue the fight to ratify the ERA.160  
In a similar effort to preserve the progress towards a realized REA, the House 
of Representatives saw a new proposal for the ERA in February 2021 and sent 
it to committee on April 28, 2021.161  Likewise, another joint resolution to 
remove the ratification deadline was introduced in the House in January 
2021.162  This resolution passed the House and was received in the Senate 
March 18, 2021.163 
The only threat imposed by the ERA is that women will no longer be 
constitutionally less than men.  The ERA, however, would have a substantive 
effect on gendered laws and policies. The language proposed by the ERA 
mirrors that of the Fourteenth Amendment, which suggest that sex 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Republicans against the ERA were concerned that such an amendment would 
“undo” their strides in enacting anti-abortion laws and regulations. See infra text 
accompanying note 156.  Kurtzleben, supra note 151. 
 156. Id.  The fact that women make up less than seven percent of House 
Republicans is an issue for another time, but still provides a shocking example of the 
political injustices to gender equality. 
 157. Id. 
158. Pete Williams, States Appeal Ruling that they Waited Too Long to Ratify the 
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discrimination would then be subject to strict scrutiny.164  This broad 
application of strict scrutiny to differentiation based on sex would undermine 
positive steps towards substantive equality by taking an “equality as 
sameness” rather than an “equity through equal outcome” approach.  Strict 
scrutiny would require practices like affirmative action and laws that benefit 
women and differentiate based on biological differences to be struck down as 
unconstitutional.  
A look at affirmative action cases shows how strict scrutiny was 
immediately weaponized against racial benefits.165  Strict scrutiny has not 
harbored adequate protection against racism; racial discrimination endures 
while the successful cases are used to overturn affirmative action.166  This is 
clearly the opposite of the outcome preferred by the equality movement.  The 
ERA includes a two-year grace period before the amendment takes full force 
– this grace period seems to allow public entities and states the time to ensure 
their laws and policies that currently stand up to intermediate scrutiny can be 
corrected to meet strict scrutiny standards.  This would stop states from 
passing legislation to help or benefit women.  The following Part aims to 
impart the need for legislation that provides benefits to women. 
IV. DISCRIMINATORY IMPACTS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Despite constitutional protections and conscientious legislation, there is 
still much room for improvement when it comes to protecting women from 
the injustices of systemic discrimination.  Subpart A of this discussion 
explores the importance of the ERA and how it could be adopted alongside 
systemic change in scrutiny analysis to promote substantive equality 
outcomes.  Subpart B then explains how equality in legal documents such as 
the Constitution is important in guaranteeing and achieving equality in 
practice.  Legislation has yet to completely remedy the ways that society 
 
 164. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell., J., 
concurring) (“There is another, and I find compelling, reason for deferring a general 
categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny. The 
Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise 
question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratification by the 
States. If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the will of the people 
accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. By acting prematurely 
and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at 
the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic 
process, are debating the proposed Amendment. It seems to me that this reaching out 
to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision which is currently in process 
of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative 
processes.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (providing 
greater opportunities for the black minority at the expense of the white majority results 
in unacceptable reverse discrimination). 
 166. See, e.g., id. 
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systemically discriminates against women, Subpart C outlines examples 
including parental leave, lactation breaks for new mothers, and insurance 
coverage of contraception.  Subpart D looks at sex-based price discrimination 
and how the Pink Tax disproportionately affects women’s out of pocket 
expenses.  Reasons why a substantive equality model is important in these 
areas is included throughout the discussion alongside examples of how the 
United States can provide equality guarantees in these areas.  Finally, Subparts 
E and F explain the importance of switching to a substantive equality model 
in the United States and how changing the scrutiny analysis is a crucial step 
in making genuine equality a reality. 
Issues surrounding gender equality and racial equality should not be 
construed as competing interests, and as such, arguments in favor of one 
should not be perceived in exclusion of the other but, rather, a combined front 
for human equality with different needs and applications.  Race and gender 
are both attributes assigned by accident that have absolutely no bearing on 
one’s potential.167  However, while there is no difference whatsoever between 
black and white besides what can be seen with the eye, there are inherent 
differences between women and men.  Although gender inequality and the 
historical subordination of women can be compared to racial subordination 
and inequality, “it cannot be analogized with this experience, either 
jurisprudentially or practically, nor should women’s status be conceptualized 
as that of a minority.”168  Women as a class are far from a minority – they 
account for half of the world’s population, and, “therefore, also half of its 
potential.”169   
Regardless of the nation, constituency, or community, women represent 
around half of the total population.  Women’s rights are intertwined into every 
family, every community, and every race – it seems surprising to need a 
discussion for women’s rights separate from men’s rights given sex 
discrimination affects every single person.170  Despite the ubiquitous 
detrimental impact gender inequality has on subordinating women through 
unequal access and structural gender stereotypes, the Constitution is still silent 
on gender equality today.171 
 
 167. “And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or 
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex 
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. 
As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of 
invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard 
to the actual capabilities of its individual members.” Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87. 
 168. IRVING, supra note 5, at 35. 
 169. Gender Equality, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/global-
issues/gender-equality [https://perma.cc/K4K6-ZUJF] (last visited May 10, 2021). 
170. Gender equality will not be realized until by only focusing on women.  
Discrimination against women continues to enforce male stereotypes as well. 
However, it is women who are the disadvantaged class from unequal treatment and 
should receive the benefits of reform. 
 171. IRVING, supra note 5, at 58; see also U.S. CONST. 
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A. Equal Rights Amendment 
The lack of explicit equality guarantees in our Constitution sets the 
United States back almost seventy-five years.172 Justice Ginsburg observed 
that “Every constitution in the world written since the year 1950 [. . .] has the 
equivalent of an equal rights amendment, and we don’t.”173  Equal rights for 
women has been a long-desired change, but would the ERA be the victory that 
has been hoped for?   
Absent strict scrutiny analysis, the ERA could be enforced to have 
positive outcomes for women’s rights.  If the United States were to adopt a 
South African approach to equality outcomes and apply scrutiny standards 
like their unfair discrimination test, the ERA would be able to coexist with 
gendered benefits.  Justice Ginsburg urged Congress to scrap the current ERA 
proposal and start anew.174  Better yet, Congress needs to restart the 
ratification process of the ERA alongside a shift in the Court’s scrutiny 
analysis to more openly account for advantageous legislation in women’s 
rights.175 
The application of strict scrutiny to sex discrimination claims would 
restrict courts from making allowances where legitimate differentiation is 
necessary.176  Strict scrutiny applied to sex discrimination would cause serious 
problems when confronted with actual gender differences like childbearing.177  
Does intermediate scrutiny adequately protect substantive gender equality?  It 
does not.  Countries like South Africa equate gender and race as suspect 
classes while still accounting for inherent gender differences through case-by-
case analysis of unfair discrimination.  Women – who account for roughly 
half of the population – belong to various cultures, social groups, sexual 
orientations, political affiliations, family structures, and communities.  
Multiple voices are needed to represent the different groups women are a part 
of in determining “whether a rule or practice is just” based on “the extent to 
 
 172. Kurtzleben, supra note 151. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. It is important to note that Ginsburg’s litigation strategy in the early sex 
discrimination cases to present Equal Protection for sex as something that applied 
equally to men and that would benefit men and many of her cases involved laws that 
disadvantaged men. While this was necessary to get the all-male judiciary to 
understand how these laws were unfair, it may have come at the cost of recognizing 
that sometimes women truly are disadvantaged and could benefit from legislation that 
addresses this reality. 
 176. Any laws viewed as benefiting women would not pass. Therefore, a 
substantive equality mindset is necessary to allow beneficial treatment to remedy past 
discriminatory impact. 
 177. The complexities of the female reproductive system obviously necessitate 
differential treatment in health care and reproductive health related situations. 
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which it affirms or undermines their humanity, status, socio-economic 
disadvantage and agency (dignity, equality, and freedom).”178  
Intermediate scrutiny was a positive step for gender rights, but it seems 
that while accounting for the inherent biological differences between men and 
women, this standard does not allow enough focus on the necessary 
differential treatment these biological differences should elicit.  The South 
African approach to discrimination claims has not been perfect, nor has it been 
able to bring about the substantive change it was striving for, yet the United 
States is in a much better place to implement these changes.179  South Africa 
is still a young and growing democracy whereas the United States is well 
established – but South Africa has a twentieth-century constitution that allows 
for transformative growth into the twenty-first century.  The United States 
needs to jump into the twenty-first century where gender equality should be 
embedded in our constitution, our laws, and the standards that courts apply to 
determine the purpose of discriminatory practices.  By equating all suspect 
classes in the United States and enlisting a more South African approach to 
determining what is fair versus unfair discrimination will allow a more 
tailored means of achieving substantive equality through the resolution of 
discrimination claims.180 
B. Gendered Language in the Law 
The use of masculine language in legal instruments is a damning practice 
for gender equality.181  To embed equality in our constitution, our laws, and 
judicial standards, the language used throughout these documents must be 
inclusive.  Although one could argue that masculine pronouns have always 
been used to refer to people individually and collectively, choosing masculine 
pronouns to represent men and women further subordinates women.  The 
mindset that masculine language can be used in a gender-neutral fashion harks 
back to treatment of women as property, referred to only through their fathers 
or husbands.  Even now, people would be uncomfortable if the Constitution 
read “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States 
of America. [She] shall hold [her] Office during the Term of four Years.”182  
If the United States Constitution were rewritten to replace all of the male 
 
 178. Catherine Albertyn, ‘The Stubborn Persistence of Patriarchy’? Gender 
Equality and Cultural Diversity in South Africa, 2 CONST. CT. REV. 165, 206 (2009). 
 179. South Africa attempted to initiate wide-scale, progressive change as part of 
the shift in governmental structure. The United States as well established and have a 
more stable government and political climate to implement a gradual change than a 
new democracy would have. 
 180. Regardless of whether substantive equality was the intention of our white, 
male founders. 
 181. It is important to recognize that individual men are not to blame for the mass 
disparate treatment of women, but rather the institution of male domination in society 
that has placed men over women in power and privilege. SANDRA FREDMAN, WOMEN 
AND THE LAW 2 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997). 
 182. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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pronouns with female pronouns, it is doubtful that it would be read as gender-
neutral. 
The framers of the United States Constitution filled it with many “he 
shalls” and “he mays” in a time where they had no intention of allowing 
women the eligibility to share their opinions or vote, let alone to hold the 
presidency or sit as members of Congress.183  While the “he shalls” and “he 
mays” might be interpreted today as gender neutral in application, the original 
intention was clearly not to convey equal opportunity.  Gender equality has 
been a long, ongoing battle for women all over the world, yet in a nation that 
has made significant gains in treating men and women more equally, 
Americans are still being governed by a document that uses gender pronouns 
from over two centuries ago.  The use of gendered language can never be 
neutral unless all genders are represented.  Including a female discourse 
parallel to normalized patriarchal expressions is not “merely a matter of legal 
precision and formal inclusion,” rather, such an inclusion revolutionizes 
“language as a form of representation” where the exclusion or inclusion of 
words “may convey privilege or priority.”184   
The social and cultural constructs of what it means to be a man or a 
woman has changed drastically over just the last ten years – so why have 
equality protections not been adapted to these constructions?  In Frontiero, 
Brennan’s majority opinion recognized the improved position of women in 
American society while emphasizing the changes yet to come: “it can hardly 
be doubted that . . . women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, 
discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps 
most conspicuously, in the political arena.”185  Women are no longer only 
homemakers, but congresswomen, judges, presidential candidates, and vice 
presidents;186 and, therefore, deserve recognition in American legal 
instruments.  A simple “he [or she] shall hold [the] office” completely 
reconstrues the male-only intention of the framers and leaves no ambiguity 
whatsoever as to who is guaranteed rights under the Constitution.  
The law is not some abstract, pre-determined institution of right and 
wrong – it is a functional representation of the ideologies and interests of 
various groups in society.187  Gender ideologies have been changing for 
centuries, yet “the law” has not adapted with it.  The male perspective 
pervades almost every aspect of the law because recognized “interests have 
 
 183. IRVING, supra note 5, at 42–43. 
 184. Id. at 42. 
 185. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685–86 (1973). 
 186. Presidential Candidates.  BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_candidates,_2020 [https://perma.cc/GM23-
K3KM] (last visited May 10, 2021); Alexander Burns et al., Who’s Running for 
President in 2020?, N.Y. TIMES (updated April 8, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/us/politics/2020-presidential-
candidates.html [https://perma.cc/D5YF-WWW6]; Kamala Harris, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/vice-president-harris/ 
[https://perma.cc/5BVG-GYPW] (last visited May 10, 2021). 
 187. FREDMAN, supra note 181, at 2. 
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always been predominately male; not only because the vast majority of law-
makers have been male, but also because men have dominated over 
women.”188  
One can argue, as many Republicans opposing the ERA have, that the 
“[Fourteenth] [A]mendment [already] guarantees all citizens the equal 
protection of the laws.”189  While it is true that the Fourteenth Amendment 
has been expanded through common law to apply to women and sex 
discrimination, nowhere in the Constitution are women explicitly guaranteed 
equal rights with men.  New Jersey Republican Jeff Van Drew, who voted in 
support of the ERA, challenged, “Why would you vote against it?  Just in the 
face of it, you believe in equal rights, you know, for everybody right?”190  Van 
Drew’s inquiry of opponents mirrors the incredulity of countless women that 
so many Twenty-First Century legislators and American citizens continue to 
fight for the political, social, economic, and cultural marginalization of 
women.  To oppose the historical opportunity to finally textually equalize men 
and women on the grounds that doing so may give women the right to control 
their own bodies is to say, “we don’t support gender equality.”  If Congress 
ratifies the Equal Rights Amendment, it will be a huge win for gender rights 
activists and a crucial step towards systemic equality. 
C. Benefits Based on Pregnancy  
Another area where gender rights activists have been pushing for change 
is pregnancy-related medical leave and lactation breaks for new mothers.  The 
Court still considers making these provisions, along with maternity leave, to 
be “special benefits.”191  During the iconic legal battle against sex 
discrimination in the 1970s, the Supreme Court was simultaneously making a 
sex-based determination that would set back the realization of substantive 
equality for women.192  In Geduldig, a woman was denied compensation from 
a Disability Fund to which she contributed because her disability was arising 
from a normal pregnancy.193  The majority blatantly stated, “we cannot agree 
that the exclusion of this disability from coverage amounts to invidious 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.”194  The Court misguidedly 
determined that it did not “discriminate against any definable group or class” 
because there was “no risk from which men [were] protected and women 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Natalie Andrews, House Votes to Eliminate Deadline on Adding ERA to 
Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2020 12:55 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-eliminate-deadline-on-adding-era-to-
constitution-11581610979?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1 (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. (“[Van Drew] switched party affiliation in December [2019].”). 
 191. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (distinguishing pregnancy 
discrimination from discrimination based on sex). 
 192. Id. (same). 
 193. Id. at 489–92. 
 194. Id. at 494. 
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[were] not” and “no risk from which women [were] protected and men [were] 
not.”195   
Obviously, the risks associated with pregnancy only relate to women.  
Therefore, if women were protected from such risks, it would still be true that 
there was “no risk from which women [were] protected and men [were] not” 
and vice versa.196  In making this decision, the Supreme Court 
unapologetically claimed the exclusion of benefits arising from pregnancy is 
not disproportionately affecting women and created a barrier separating 
pregnancy from being a woman.197   
Justice Brennan saw the unreasonableness of such a decision and voiced 
a clearer opinion in his dissent.198  Brennan questioned why disability related 
to pregnancy could be so easily discounted when “workers are compensated 
for costly disabilities such as heart attacks, voluntary disabilities such as 
cosmetic surgery or sterilization [and even] ‘normal’ disabilities such as 
removal of irritating wisdom teeth.”199  Brennan’s incredulity most likely 
stems from the fact that “disabilities caused by pregnancy, however, like other 
physically disabling conditions covered by the Code, require medical care, 
often include hospitalization, anesthesia and surgical procedures, and may 
involve genuine risk to life.”200  The idea of even needing to provide 
comparison of medical costs and the “disability” caused by removing wisdom 
teeth versus having a human being removed from one’s body seems 
outrageous – one is clearly more “irritating” than the other.  However, it seems 
even more baffling that sterilization was covered for men where pregnancy 
was not covered for women.201   
Brennan emphasized something the majority seemed to miss – that 
“despite the Code’s broad goals and scope of coverage, compensation is 
denied for disabilities suffered in connection with a ‘normal’ pregnancy – 
disabilities suffered only by women.”202  Brennan’s dissent expressed his view 
that  
By singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability 
peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard for 
disability compensation: a limitation is imposed upon the disabilities 
for which women workers may recover, while men receive full 
compensation for all disabilities suffered, including those that affect 
 
 195. Id. at 496–97. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 498–505 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. at 499–500 (emphasis added). 
 200. Id. at 500 (emphasis added). 
 201. Id. (emphasis added). 
 202. Id. (emphasis added). 
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only or primarily their sex, such as prostatectomies, circumcision, 
hemophilia, and gout.”203 
 
This explanation lends itself to the conclusion that “such dissimilar treatment 
of men and women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked 
to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination.”204  Yet, the majority 
failed to perceive the inherent discrimination in its decision.   
The South African Constitution, however, explicitly guarantees equal 
protection based on pregnancy, thereby avoiding any court-interpreted 
discrepancies between pregnancy and sex.205  The United States has made 
progress in protecting pregnancy discrimination through Title VII, which was 
enacted to prevent employment discrimination by the federal government 
“based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”206  Then, the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title VII “to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.”207  This amendment expanded the 
definition of “‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’” to include “because of 
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall 
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of 
benefits.”208  Although Congress took this step in protecting discrimination in 
the employment realm, by insisting on a formal equality approach and failing 
to equate pregnancy with sex, the Court has abdicated an important role that 
it could have played in guaranteeing substantive equality. 
1. Maternity Leave 
The issues faced by new and expecting mothers have gained more 
attention in recent years.  Some of the most generous maternity leave plans 
are found in Europe where new mothers are allowed “to take dozens of weeks 
of paid leave,” whereas the “United States doesn’t guarantee them any” paid 
maternity leave.209  Even in Europe not all leave is “fully paid.”210  For 
example, women working in the United Kingdom are guaranteed “a whole 
year (52 weeks) of maternity leave.  Thirty-nine of those weeks are partially 
 
 203. Id. at 501 (emphasis added). 
 204. Id. (emphasis added). 
 205. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Ch. 2, § 9; supra Section II(B)(1). 
 206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16 (2018). 
 207. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.  
 208. Id. (emphasis added). This amendment did not create a requirement of health 
insurance benefits for abortions. 
 209. Michelle Toh, These countries offer the most generous maternity leave, CNN, 
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/19/news/economy/countries-most-
maternity-leave/index.html (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. 
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paid” which amounts to about “[twelve] fully paid weeks.”211  The United 
States, however, has been found one the “least generous” countries when it 
comes to maternity leave.212  In the United States maternity leave options have 
been left to “individual employers to decide how much to offer.”213   
The United Nations agency stated that protection is required for new and 
expecting mothers “to ensure that they will not lose their job simply because 
of pregnancy or maternity leave.”214  Equality between men and women will 
not be achieved if there is still differential “opportunity and treatment for men 
and women at work”215 – including parental leave.216  A substantive equality 
model not only calls for more benefits to be provided regarding maternity 
leave, benefits based on pregnancy, and lactation breaks when a new mother 
returns to work, but for providing parental leave to new fathers as well.  The 
number of employers who offer “parental” leave are a minority, but it is 
quickly becoming more common.217   
The increased desire for parental leave over maternity leave stems partly 
from Ginsburg’s idea that “women would not achieve equality in the 
workplace as long as men were discouraged from taking on caregiver 
roles.”218  As of December 2019, the United States was one of “only two 
countries out of 170 that [did] not currently provide financial support during 
maternity leave.”219  Although the United States was “one of the few countries 
without federal paid maternity leave”220 for a long time, Congress passed the 
Federal Employee Paid Leave Act in 2019 to provide twelve weeks of paid 
family or medical leave for federal employees.221  This paid leave policy 
would apply to “mothers and fathers of newborns, newly adopted children[,] 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Parental leave refers to time off given to new fathers, as well as new mothers 
– in place of maternity leave which is provided for women only.  
 217. Noam Scheiber, Victory for Fathers in a Parental Leave Case That Could Be 
a Harbinger, N.Y. TIMES, (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/business/fathers-parental-leave-jpmorgan-
chase.html?auth=login-email&login=email. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Kate Bennett & Betsy Klein, Senate approves Ivanka Trump-backed paid 
family leave for federal employees, CNN, (Dec. 17, 2019, 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/17/politics/ivanka-trump-federal-paid-family-
leave/index.html  (“The United States and New Guinea are the only two countries out 
of 170 that do not currently provide financial support during maternity leave, 
according to the United Nations.”). 
 220. Jessica Grose, Why Dads Don’t Take Parental Leave, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 19, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/parenting/why-dads-dont-take-
parental-leave.html?auth=login-email&login=email 
 221. Federal Employee Paid Leave Act, H.R. 1534, 116th Cong. (2019);; Federal 
Employee Paid Leave Act, S. 1174, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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or foster children.”222  However, this benefit would only be available to federal 
employees and would not be a nationwide benefit for all working 
Americans.223  
The Federal Employee Paid Leave Act (“FEPLA”) should be, and is, an 
important step in guaranteeing workplace equality for new parents, but it has 
not had quite the successful coverage hoped for.  Unfortunately, “tens of 
thousands of federal employees aren’t covered under the new paid parental 
leave law” because it does not include “federal employees who aren’t covered 
by Title 5”224  There is still much room for improvement of this bill and 
nation-wide expansion of paid leave policies at every level. 
2. Lactation Breaks 
Although the Court has refused to see the issues surrounding pregnancy 
as sex based, legislation regarding parental leave and lactation breaks has 
gained strides for the equality movement.  On a federal level, the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) amended Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) to require employers to provide “a reasonable break time for an 
employee to express breast milk for her nursing child for [one] year after the 
child’s birth each time such employee has need to express the milk.”225  The 
ACA also requires employers to provide “a place, other than a bathroom, that 
is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public, 
 
 222. Ted Barrett & Ellie Kaufman, Congress passes defense bill that would give 
US a space force and federal workers parental leave for the first time, CNN, (Dec. 
17, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/17/politics/ndaa-passes-congress-parental-
leave-space-force/index.html. 
 223. “Though the provision applies to federal workers only, Ivanka Trump has 
said she will continue to advocate for making paid family leave a possibility for all 
American workers heading into the election year.” Bennett & Klein, supra note 219. 
 224. Nicole Ogrysko, Not all federal employees are covered under the new paid 
parental leave law, at least not yet, FEDERAL NEWS NETWORK, (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/benefits/2020/01/not-all-federal-employees-are-
covered-under-the-new-paid-parental-leave-law-at-least-not-yet/.  FEPLA 
specifically amended the Title 5 leave requirement that applies only to those 
employees as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 6381(1). See 5 U.S.C. § 6381(1) (“[T]he term 
“employee” means any individual who— (A) is an “employee”, as defined by section 
6301(2), including any individual employed in a position referred to in clause (v) or 
(ix) of section 6301(2), but excluding any individual employed by the government of 
the District of Columbia any individual employed on a temporary or intermittent basis, 
and any employee of the Government Accountability Office or the Library of 
Congress; and (B) has completed at least 12 months of service as an employee (within 
the meaning of subparagraph (A))”); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6382. 
 225. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2018); 29 U.S.C. § 
207(r)(1)(A) (2010).; H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2d sess. 2010); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, Work and Hour Division: Frequently Asked Questions – Break Time for 
Nursing Mothers, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/nursing-mothers/faq. 
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which may be used by an employee to express breast milk.”226  The ACA also 
specified that these breaks would not be required to be compensated, but this 
amendment still expanded workplace protections for new mothers by setting 
federal standards for lactation breaks. 
Although the amended language of FLSA provided an exemption for any 
“employer that employs less than [fifty] employees” if doing so would 
“impose an undue hardship,”227 recent legislation has created additional 
requirements for public buildings.228  The Fairness For Breastfeeding Mothers 
Act of 2019 requires – with reasonable exceptions – that “the appropriate 
authority of a covered public building [to] ensure that the building contains a 
lactation room that is made available for use by members of the public to 
express breast milk.”229  These lactation rooms must be a “hygienic place, 
other than a bathroom, that (A) is shielded from view; (B) is free from 
intrusion; and (C) contains a chair, a working surface, and, if the public 
building is otherwise supplied with electricity, an electrical outlet.”230  This 
amendment took effect July 25, 2020, which will further expand the long-
awaited protections for working mothers.231 
As more voices speak up about discrimination in the workplace, more 
steps are being taken to improve protections against pregnancy- and sex-based 
discrimination.  Pregnancy and breastfeeding are biologically linked to 
women, and the cultural mindset up to this point has not allowed working 
mothers to balance their full potential at work while providing fully for their 
children as well.  Denying paid maternity leave or the provision of lactation 
breaks when a new mother returns to work are inherently discriminatory based 
on sex.  Paid parental leave allows working mothers and fathers to spend 
crucial developmental time with their children and establishes a stronger 
family unit from the start.  The benefits of flexibility in the workplace to 
promote healthy family structures is not only important to American society 
at large, but it shows respect for working parents and works to strike down 
lingering sex stereotypes of women as caregivers and men as the primary 
breadwinners.  
3. Birth Control Coverage  
Although many recent strides have been made to guarantee women more 
benefits relating to reproductive healthcare, the fight for women’s health care 
equality is by no means a new issue.  Women have been baffled for decades 
 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 18001; 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(A); H.R. 3590; U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, supra note 225. 
 227. 42 U.S.C. § 18001; 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(A); H.R. 3590; U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, supra note 225. 
 228. FAIRNESS FOR BREASTFEEDING MOTHERS ACT of 2019. 40 USC 101, 40 
U.S.C.A. § 3318 (2020).  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
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at how easily Viagra was given insurance coverage while gaining coverage 
for birth control is still an ongoing struggle.232  Women have gained multiple 
victories in achieving rights to equal healthcare,233 but “the pill” still lacks 
equal coverage as Viagra.234   
The purported difference between Viagra and birth control is that Viagra 
is a “medical drug that treats a medical condition whereas contraceptives are 
considered ‘lifestyle drugs’ that are not medically necessary.”235  In 2012, 
President Obama’s ACA required “employer-provided health insurance” to 
cover most forms of birth control.236  Although the pill is available through 
several different sources,237 as of 2016, the United States was one of twenty 
different countries that “require a prescription in order to get a monthly 
supply of the pill.”238  The prescription requirement for the pill limits access 
to contraceptives for lower income women and those who are not covered by 
 
 232. “Within weeks of hitting the U.S. market in 1998, more than half of Viagra 
prescriptions received health insurance coverage.” Geraldine Sealey, Erections Get 
Insurance; Why Not the Pill?, ABC NEWS, (Jan. 14, 2006), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=91538; see also Amy Goldstein, Viagra’s 
Success Fuels Gender Bias Debate, WASH. POST, (May 20, 1998), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/viagra/stories/pills20.htm (“Less than two months after 
[Viagra] exploded onto the market, more than half the prescriptions for the new drug 
[were] being subsidized by health plans.”). 
 233. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding a Massachusetts law 
criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons a “violation of 
contraception per se” and in violation of single persons rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding a 
Connecticut law criminalizing the use of any contraception unconstitutional as a 
violation of marital privacy). 
 234.  
 235. Angela Chen, Covering Viagra, But Not Birth Control?, JSTOR DAILY, (Feb. 
23, 2016), https://daily.jstor.org/cover-viagra-but-not-birth-control/. 
 236. Jacqueline Howard, Trump administration weakens Obamacare birth control 
coverage mandate, CNN, (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/health/birth-control-exemption-trump-
bn/index.html; Chen, supra note 235. 
 237. About Us, THE PILL CLUB, https://thepillclub.com/about-us (“[Members] get 
their birth control prescription online and delivered straight to their mailbox. No more 
unnecessary doctors visits and long pharmacy lines.”). Planned Parenthood offers “10 
different birth control products by mail.” The “Planned Parent Direct App make it 
convenient to get birth control pills prescribed and delivered.” They also offer other 
contraceptives that can be picked up at a pharmacy such as “the ring and the patch.” 
Frequently Asked Questions: Birth Control, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
https://plannedparenthooddirect.org/. 
 238. Melissa Mahtani, It’s #FreeThePill day, a day of activism to make birth 
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insurance due to the costs associated with doctor’s fees and the pills 
themselves.239 
The ACA initially required “almost all employers” to include 
contraception in their health plans because insurers were required to “cover 
all preventative services. No co-pays. No deductibles.”240  The ACA 
exempted “Houses of worship” but did not extend such exemptions to 
religiously affiliated non-profits.241  Those opposed to contraception were less 
than thrilled and many non-profit religious organizations were “furious” at the 
lack of religious-exemptions available to them.242  Although women were still 
required to have a prescription in order to receive birth control under the ACA, 
the Act increased access to the pill across pay grades. 
The Trump administration has attempted to overturn the ACA by issuing 
several regulations that “make it much easier for an employer to exclude 
contraceptive coverage from any health plan it offers.”243  These regulations 
allow “any employer – nonprofit or for-profit – to exclude some or all 
contraceptive methods and services” based on religious or even simply moral 
objections.244  Currently, twenty-nine states require contraceptive coverage by 
insurers that provide coverage for other prescription drugs while twenty-one 
states allow “employers and insurers to refuse to comply with the 
contraceptive coverage mandate.”245 
After the ACA was passed, the Supreme Court heard several cases 
considering “whether religious groups could refuse to comply with regulation 
requiring contraceptive coverage.”246  In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 
the Court decided that “closely held corporations” could not be forced to 
adhere to the contraceptive mandate and provide coverage to their 
employees.247  Now, the Trump administration is involved in a case to decide 
“whether the Trump administration may allow employers to limit women’s 
 
 239. Sealey, supra note 232. 
 240. E.J. Graff, The Difference Between Viagra and The Pill, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, (Jan. 25, 2012), https://prospect.org/health/difference-viagra-pill/. 
 241. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Consider Limits on Contraception 
Coverage, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/17/us/supreme-court-contraception-
coverage.html 
 242. Graff, supra note 240.  
 243. Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, (April 15, 
2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/insurance-coverage-
contraceptives; Mahtani, supra note 238 (“The Trump administration wants to 
overturn the Affordable Health Act.”). 
 244. Although the moral objection exception applies to a more limited group of 
employers, specifically those that are “not a publicly traded company.”  Insurance 
Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 243; Howard, supra note 236. 
 245. Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 243. 
 246. Liptak, supra note 241. 
 247. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014); Chen, supra 
note 235.  
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access to free birth control under the ACA.”248  In May 2019, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a nationwide preliminary 
injunction against the Trump administration’s regulations.249  Oral arguments 
before the Supreme Court were postponed to May 6, 2020 where the case were 
reversed and remanded to the Third Circuit.250  
Low-income women with restricted access to birth control often have to 
rely on family planning clinics such as Planned Parenthood that may receive 
federal funding from Title X.251  The Trump administration, however, 
“announced shortened funding periods for Title X grants” in 2018 and 
completely blocked Title X funding in 2019 to clinics that “refer women to 
abortion services.”252  The cut funding would have helped organizations to 
cover “STD prevention, cancer screenings and contraception.”253  The ACA 
worked to decrease “women’s contraceptive out-of-pocket expenses by 20 
percent,” but if the Supreme Court allows the Trump administration’s 
regulations to go into effect in May, the cost of birth control will be widely 
unaffordable and access to contraception will be more restricted.254  
 
 248. Liptak, supra note 241. This case has notably arisen amid a national 
conversation over women’s rights as several states propose laws that would virtually 
ban abortion. Mahtani, supra note 238. 
 249. Pennsylvania v. President United States, 930 F.3d 543, 576 (3d Cir. 2019), 
cert. granted Trump v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020), rev’d Little 
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S.Ct. 2367 (July 
8, 2020). 
 250. SUPREME COURT DOCKET, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-454.html (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2020); SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 2019, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArgum
entCalMay2020.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).  Oral arguments were postponed due 
to concerns related to COVID-19. 
 251. Shanoor Seervai, Roosa Tikkanen, & Sara R. Collins, Trump Administration 
Appeals Contraception Case to SCOTUS: What This Means for Women’s Health, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/what-recent-federal-courts-rulings-
contraception-mean-us-womens-health.  Title X is a federal grant program aimed at 
providing comprehensive family planning through education, wellness exams, 
affordable birth control and other reproductive health care services. Title X: The 
Nation’s Program for Affordable Birth Control and Reproductive Health Care, 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/health-
care-equity/title-x. 
 252. Seervai, Tikkanen, & Collins, supra note 251.  
 253. Sarah McCammon, Trump Administration Announces Sweeping Changes to 
Federal Family Planning Program, NPR, (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/22/690544297/trump-administration-proposes-
sweeping-changes-to-federal-family-planning-progra. 
 254. Seervai, Tikkanen, & Collins, supra note 251. 
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Under a new scrutiny analysis, like South Africa’s Harksen test,255 
pregnancy discrimination would be inherently unfair unless proven otherwise.  
Any discrimination or differential treatment would be discrimination and it 
would not matter that the Court did not equate pregnancy with sex – 
pregnancy discrimination would be considered wrong on its own.  Under this 
new analysis, for pregnancy discrimination to stand, a fairness determination 
would need to be made based on the circumstantial factors and its impact on 
those discriminated against.  The substantive equality model can be used to 
derive a non-exclusive list of “Fairness factors” to be applied in the fairness 
determination stage of the analysis.  Doing so will not give the Court complete 
deferential power, as in South Africa, but will limit the bounds of their 
decisions in a reasonable manner.  Although, it seems unlikely that this type 
of discrimination would be considered fair. 
Likewise, coverage of contraceptives and the requirement of a 
prescription to receive birth control could be seen as differential treatment of 
women.  Under the Harksen test, differential treatment amounts to 
discrimination, and if it is based on one of the suspect classes (including sex 
and pregnancy – both of which are involved in the issue of contraception), it 
is inherently unfair unless proven otherwise.  Therefore, the impact of this 
discrimination would need to be considered in context.  Restricted access to 
birth control affects women’s healthcare across the board and, 
disproportionately so, women in low-income areas.256  The Third Circuit 
acknowledged that “cost is a significant barrier to contraceptive use and 
access” and “the most effective forms of contraceptives are the most 
expensive.”257  This can lead to an increase in unwanted pregnancies, further 
draining the resources and finances of low-income families in childcare costs 
or the costs associated with obtaining abortions.   
The United States Center for Disease Control reported a study that 
“nearly 65% of women ages 15 to 49” use some form of birth control, and the 
birth control pill has been found to be the “second most common contraceptive 
method.”258  Women of reproductive age also tend to be disproportionately 
affected by lack of coverage for contraception.  “[S]tudies have shown that 
women of reproductive age spend about two-thirds more than men on out-of-
pocket health-care costs” and that “birth control and reproductive health-care 
services are believed to account for much of the difference.”259  It is not just 
 
 255. Cite to Harksen test (balancing fair versus unfair discrimination against the 
relative impact of the discrimination) 
 256. Liptak, supra note 241. 
 257. Pennsylvania v. President United States, 930 F.3d 543, 576 (3d Cir. 2019), 
cert. granted Trump v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020), rev’d Little 
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S.Ct. 2367 (July 
8, 2020). 
 258. Jessica Ravitz & Debra Goldschmidt, Nearly two-thirds of US women use 
contraception, CDC reports, CNN, (Dec. 19, 2018, 11:13 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/19/health/contraceptive-use-cdc-study/index.html. 
 259. Sealey, supra note 232. 
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women of reproductive age and beyond who face sex discrimination from 
their inherent biological differences.  Young women get firsthand experience 
of unequal health care and the subordination of female reproductive rights 
when they go to buy tampons for the first time.  Young women face 
differential treatment through gender-based price discrimination that effects 
“female marketed” products from birth to retirement.  
D. Sex-Based Price Discrimination 
Institutionalized sex discrimination has been interwoven into American 
society for so long that it would be reasonable to ask if the United States can 
afford to fix it.  Many people are aware of sex discrimination through the 
gender wage gap and the disproportionately low percentages of women in 
high-level jobs;260 however, it is the daily discrimination women face that 
goes unnoticed.  One of the most blatant – yet overlooked – discriminatory 
practices that burden women daily is the Pink Tax.  The Pink Tax – also 
known as “price discrimination” or “gender-pricing” – Is the term used to refer 
to the extra cost for “female-specific products compared with the gender-
neutral goods or those marketed to men.”261  The term “Pink Tax” was chosen 
to draw attention to the “color of products directly marketed to girls and 
women.”262   
Although it may be difficult to believe that “pink” items marketed to 
women would actually cost more than “blue” items marketed to men, studies 
 
 260. In the legal profession, women represent 50 percent of J.D.s awarded, yet 
only 38 percent of the actual workforce. Since men have dominated the legal field for 
decades it is unsurprising that women still have to catch up. However, what is 
surprising is that of the 38 percent of women in the legal workforce in 2019, those 
women represented 45.91 percent of Associates while only 22.7 percent of Partners 
were women. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT 
GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW 2, 4 (2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam 
/aba/administrative/women/current_glance_2019.pdf.  The statistics of women’s 
representation in the legal field has no bearing on their ability to perform the same 
legal tasks as men. In fact, women in the legal field experienced a milestone over the 
last year when “every journal at the flagship law review of the top 16 law schools was 
to be led by a woman.” Erin Spencer, First All-Women Class Of Top Law Journal 
Editors Leaves Behind A Byline And Legacy, FORBES, (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/erinspencer1/2020/02/11/first-all-women-class-of-top-
law-journal-editors-leaves-behind-a-byline-and-legacy/#46271b4f758e.  
 261. Anne-Marcelle Ngabirano, ‘Pink Tax’ forces women to pay more than men, 
USA TODAY, (Mar. 28, 2017 3:03 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2017/03/27/pink-tax-forces-
women-pay-more-than-men/99462846/; Candice Elliot, The Pink Tax: What’s the 
Cost of Being a Female Consumer in 2020?, LISTEN MONEY MATTERS, (Jan. 25, 
2020), https://www.listenmoneymatters.com/the-pink-tax/. 
 262. Ngabirano, supra note 261. 
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have confirmed this phenomenon.263  The New York City Department of 
Consumer Affairs published a multi-industry study264 of gender pricing 
comparing “nearly 800 products with clear male and female versions from 
more than 90 brands sold at two dozen New York City retailers, both online 
and in stores.”265  The products chosen for this study came from thirty-five 
different product categories with “similar male and female versions [that] 
were closest in branding, ingredients, appearance, textile, construction, and/or 
marketing.”266  The research on these products yielded results showing 
women’s products cost seven percent more on average than their male 
counterparts.267  In the thirty-five product categories studied, women paid 
more in all but five categories – and when men did pay more, it wasn’t by 
much.268  Overall, “women’s products cost more 42 percent of the time while 
men’s products cost more [only] 18 percent of the time.”269 
Although the Pink Tax has gained more attention in recent years, gender-
based pricing is by no means a new issue.  Nearly twenty-five years ago, a 
California State Senate studied price discrimination as part of a bill to prohibit 
“gender-based discrimination in the pricing of services”270 and found that 
“adult women effectively pa[id] a gender tax [that] cost[] each woman 
approximately $1,351 annually.”271  Although the New York City 2015 study 
did not include annual expense estimates, the results signify that women 
across the country are paying thousands of dollars more than men for the same 
 
 263. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FROM CRADLE TO CANE: THE COST OF 
BEING A FEMALE CONSUMER 6 (2015), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/partners/Study-of-Gender-Pricing-
in-NYC.pdf. The New York City Department of Consumer Affairs first investigated 
price discrimination in 1992. 
 264. Specifically, five industries were studied: “toys and accessories, children’s 
clothing, adult clothing, personal care products, and home health care products for 
seniors.” Id. at 5. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 5–13. 
 269. Id. at 5. 
 270. Cal. GENDER TAX REPEAL ACT OF 1995 AB 1100; Bill Analysis, SENATE 
RULES COMMITTEE, http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_1051-
1100/ab_1100_cfa_950831_152302_sen_floor.html [https://perma.cc/PB6B-4SS2]. 
Similarly, the New York City Council passed a bill prohibiting the public display of 
discriminatory pricing based on gender. The Department of Consumer Affairs issued 
over 100 violations each year to businesses in violation of the New York City gender 
pricing law. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 263, at 16. Press 
Release, MAYOR GIULIANI SIGNS CITY COUNCIL BILL NO. 804-A INTO 
LAW, PROHIBITING THE PUBLIC DISPLAY OF DISCRIMINATORY PRICING 
BASED ON GENDER (Jan. 9, 1998), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/98a/pr019-
98.html (on file with author). 
 271. Cal. GENDER TAX REPEAL ACT OF 1995 AB 1100; Bill Analysis, supra note 
270. 
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products throughout their lives simply because the products were a certain 
color or the marketing was targeted at women. 
 The Pink Tax and its discriminatory effects gained national attention 
when Representative Jackie Speier introduced the Pink Tax Repeal Act on 
April 3, 2019.272  The purpose of this bill was to “prohibit the pricing of 
consumer products and services that are substantially similar if such products 
or services are priced differently based on the gender of the individuals for 
whose use the products are intended or marketed or for whom the services are 
performed or offered.”273  Had this bill passed, it would have allowed 
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, and state Attorney Generals 
would be able to initiate civil action against the businesses responsible for 
discriminatory pricing on behalf of residents who were adversely affected by 
any violation of the bill.274  Although the bill did not pass, its recent 
introduction in the House of Representatives is a positive step towards 
substantive equality. 
1. Tampon Tax 
The Pink Tax can also be used to refer to what is known as the “tampon 
tax” or “period tax” which alternately indicates the sales tax paid to purchase 
feminine hygiene products such as pads, tampons, and liners.275  The “tampon 
tax” is attributed to the Pink Tax since men do not menstruate, therefore, only 
women are using feminine hygiene products and being disproportionately 
affected by the sales tax on such items.276  Since menstruation is an ongoing, 
continuous cycle, women need products like pads and tampons at least one 
week out of every month.  Pink Tax opponents argue that feminine hygiene 
products should be tax-exempt as necessities277 like “groceries and medical 
supplies.”278  Feminine hygiene products are a gender-specific product and 
 
 272. H.R. 2048, 116th Cong., (1st Sess. 2019). 
 273. Id. (Defining substantially similar products as products with “no substantial 
differences in the materials used in the product, the intended uses of the product, and 
the functional design and features of the product. A difference in coloring among any 
consumer products shall not be construed as a substantial difference.”). 
 274. Id. (“In any case in which the attorney general of a State has reason to believe 
that an interest of the residents of that State has been or is adversely affected by a 
violation of subsection (a), the attorney general may, as parens patriae, bring a civil 
action on behalf of the residents…”). 
 275. Leah Asmelash, Ohio might become the latest state to end the tax on pads 
and tampons. Here are others that already have, CNN, (Oct. 15, 2019 1:35 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/15/health/pink-tampon-tax-ohio-wellness-
trnd/index.html.  
 276. Karen Zraick, 22 States Considered Eliminating the ‘Tampon Tax’ This Year: 
Here’s What Happened., N.Y. TIMES, (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/us/tampon-tax.html. 
 277. The average American women would most likely view the use of feminine 
hygiene products as a necessity.  
 278. Zraick, supra note 276. 
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taxing such products, therefore, amounts to sex discrimination.  The blatant 
price discrimination from the tampon tax has many people asking “why are 
tampons taxed when Viagra isn’t?”279 
As of 2019, feminine hygiene products were still “subject to sales taxes 
in 35 states,” and proponents of the tax are citing it as necessary state 
revenue.280  One policy analyst described eliminating the tampon tax as a 
burden because “every time another [tax] exemption is passed, it means the 
tax rate that applies to everything else will have to increase in order to generate 
that same amount of revenue.”281  During 2019, twenty-two state legislatures 
introduced bills to “repeal the [tampon] tax, but none were signed into law.”282  
Although California has repealed the tampon tax, it did so with a two-year 
expiration date because Governor Newsom believes that California “might not 
be able to afford it past 2021.”283   
Why is it that states cannot afford to cease discriminatory practices?  
Why are steps not being taken to make it more affordable?  Gloria Steinem 
wrote, “the characteristics of the powerful, whatever they may be, are thought 
to be better than the characteristics of the powerless – and logic has nothing 
to do with it.”284  Taxing products like pads and tampons when Viagra is tax-
free sends the message that male sexual pleasure is more important than 
female reproductive health.  Most legislators are men who do not 
menstruate,285 so maybe this issue just is not important to them – or maybe 
they do not want a remedial tax shift to affect them?  Revenue cuts and tax 
increases are obviously important issues, but women should not be the ones 
shouldering this expense – a tax increase on gender-neutral products or in 
other areas entirely will shift this one-sided financial burden off women and 
onto everyone. 
Feminine hygiene/reproductive health products should either be 
provided or available at lower costs for women as one way to receive an 
“advantage” or “benefit” to remedy their historical disadvantage.  Maybe the 
higher cost of women’s products did not have the same disproportionate 
impact when men were the sole breadwinners of the family.  Now, women are 
earning their own incomes – even though their salaries have yet to equal that 
of men’s – so it is not just fathers and husbands bearing the cost of feminine 
necessities – it is the underpaid, historically disadvantaged females.286  The 
 
 279.  Id.  
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id.; see also Elliot, supra note 261. 
 283. Asmelash, supra note 275. 
 284. Gloria Steinem, If Men Could Menstruate, MS. MAGAZINE, Oct. 1978. 
 285. Steinem jests that if men could menstruate “sanitary supplies would be 
federally funded and free” and that the male menstrual cycle would be used as further 
justification for their power and the subordination of women. Id. 
 286.  “Women earn 82 cents for every dollar a man earns.” Janelle Jones, 5 Facts 
About the State of the Gender Pay Gap, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BLOG, (Mar. 19, 
2021), https://blog.dol.gov/2021/03/19/5-facts-about-the-state-of-the-gender-pay-
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issue is not just about the cost of reproductive health products or even women 
paying more for similar products as men, it is the blatant differential treatment 
that we have come to accept as “normal” that amounts to systemic sexism. 
One could attempt to argue that feminine hygiene products are not 
essentials for female reproductive health.  However, the alternative to using 
such products would be women either taking so many breaks from their 
workday to care for whatever method they employed to ensure hygienic and 
easily contained menstrual bleeding,287 or simply bleeding through their 
clothing throughout the workday.  This hinderance would affect women in the 
medical field whose hygiene breaks would have detrimental effects on patient 
care and pose a health risk if menstrual blood were exposed through their 
clothing.  Similarly, female lawyers would not be able to make it through a 
court case without needing several breaks, unless they were to face the 
professional embarrassment of bleeding through their suits.  Socially and 
culturally, it does not seem likely that Americans would be accepting to 
women walking around with menstrual blood staining their clothing and 
tarnishing their professionalism.  
If a court were to consider the Pink Tax as sex-based discrimination, it 
would most likely see the tax on tampons as facially neutral.288  While taxing 
products used only by women so obviously has a discriminatory effect on 
women, facially neutral laws contested due to a discriminatory impact based 
on sex must prove a discriminatory purpose behind the law.289  It does not 
seem likely that one could prove the tampon tax was imposed specifically to 
further subordinate women through differential pricing.290   
It seems unlikely that price discrimination would falter when put to 
intermediate scrutiny.  Therefore, systemic change in place of the current 
scrutiny analysis would better benefit gender equality and substantive equality 
across the board.  If the American constitutional analysis of sex discrimination 
were focused simply on the discriminatory outcome and impact – without the 
restrictions of discriminatory purpose – true substantive equality could be 
within reach.  The South African equality analysis is focused on the 
 
gap#:~:text=1.,for%20many%20women%20of%20color [https://perma.cc/CKA3-
EG33].  In 2020, women made 82.3% of men’s salaries annually – and “the gap is 
even wider for many women of color.” Id. 
 287. Presumably some sort of towel similar to women in “period poverty” who 
live in “resource-poor parts of countries.” These women, “owing to lack of availability 
of adequate products, use old clothes, paper, cotton or wool pieces, and even leaves to 
manage their menstrual bleeding.” Rashmi Verda, Menstrual Hygiene in Africa: No 
pad or no way to dispose it, DOWN TO EARTH (April 2, 2019),  
https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/waste/menstrual-hygiene-in-africa-no-pad-or-
no-way-to-dispose-it-63788. 
 288. Others, including myself, however, would see this as overtly differential 
treatment. Especially when compared to tax exempt Viagra. 
 289. See supra Part II.A.3.; see, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 274 (1979). 
 290. No one is going to say, “Since women make less than men, the tampon tax 
was created to further financial gender disparity.” 
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discriminatory impact on suspect classes,291 while American jurisprudence 
allows sex discrimination and differential treatment to stand simply because 
no one could prove that the discrimination was purposeful.  
E. Substantive Equality Versus Formal Equality 
The Supreme Court has typically taken the stance that gender 
preferences will “perpetuate stereotypes,” therefore favoring equal 
opportunity over equal outcome.292  This mindset is consistent with the idea 
of formal equality and seems to lend support to the stance that sex 
discrimination should only receive intermediate scrutiny – whereas racial 
discrimination receives strict scrutiny – due to the potential problems 
emerging from legitimate gender differences.293  Since formal equality 
provides facial neutrality even where the outcome still results in one party 
being advantaged over the other, its application ends up ignoring the inherent 
differences between genders in ways that further disadvantage women.   
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly allow for 
affirmative action as a method for resolving disadvantages caused by sex 
discrimination, nor does it impose any obligations to enact legislation 
protecting gender equality, the courts have considered affirmative action an 
important issue in the context of race-based college admission.294  These 
rulings, however, come with the “requirement that all race-conscious 
 
 291. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2 § 9(3). 
 292. KENDE, supra note 5, at 104–08; see Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718 (1982) (concluding that a policy excluding men from attending an all-
women’s nursing school was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor argued that exclusion of men from this school perpetuated the 
stereotype of nursing as a “woman’s job.” Id. at 729. The Court, however, has not 
rejected all sex stereotypes. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding 
a law requiring only men to register for the draft and barring women from combat). 
This case is another example of the Court recognizing gender differences in a way that 
is potentially harmful to women. While it may be seen as a benefit to women that they 
are not required to register for the draft, the same logic from Hogan could be used 
here. Barring women from combat and only requiring men to register for the draft 
perpetuates the stereotype that women are fragile and need protecting while combat is 
exclusively a man’s job. 
 293. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 294. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–75 (2003) (finding that the 
admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because substantial 
consideration of race was not accompanied by adequate individualized consideration 
and, therefore, was not “narrowly tailored to achieve [the school’s] asserted 
compelling interest in diversity.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) 
(holding the use of race as a predominant factor in the admissions process was 
narrowly tailored to “further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational 
benefits that flow from a diverse student body” and, accordingly, not prohibited by 
the Equal Protection Clause). This was the first time the Supreme Court had addressed 
“the use of race in public higher education [in] over 25 years” since Bakke. Id. at 322 
(citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
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admissions programs have a termination point” which the Court estimated 
should come by 2028.295  Even though affirmative action has yet to provide 
advantages to women as a previously disadvantaged class, the implications 
from its application to race illustrate the Court’s perception296 of affirmative 
action in practice. 
Justice Antonin Scalia explained in his view that the “government can 
never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discrimination on the basis of race in 
order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.”297  
Scalia further explained that advantaging a historically disadvantaged group 
only serves to perpetuate the thinking that disadvantaged them in the first 
place.298  Scalia’s view provides a reflection of the disparity between South 
Africa’s recognition that the disadvantages caused by structural racial and 
gender inequalities are attributed to past government actions whereas the 
United States views itself as free of transgression.299  
Substantive equality in South Africa was birthed from a history of racial 
discrimination, yet it still extended equality protections to protect a multitude 
of suspect classes beyond race.300  The United States also has a history of 
racial injustices that had major impacts on legislation and public policy.301  
Although strides towards racial equality have been short and gradual, race is 
considered a protected “suspect class” subject to a stricter level of scrutiny 
than sex discrimination.302  While concrete objections exist for why sex 
should not be subjected to strict scrutiny, arguments against sex as a suspect 
class seem to promote ideas of women as second-class citizens.  Sex should 
be a suspect class afforded advantages promoted by substantive equality in 
 
 295. Id. at 342–43. 
 296. The fact that the Court has allowed race-based affirmative action to stand for 
a span of time seems to show an awareness that it is appropriate to allow “fair” 
discrimination to achieve substantive equality and equal outcomes.  
 297. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (“Individuals who 
have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but 
under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. 
That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individual.”). 
 298. Id. (“To pursue the concept of racial entitlement – even for the most 
admirable and benign of purposes – is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the 
way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes 
of government, we are just one race here. It is American.”). 
 299. See supra Section II.B. 
 300. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2 § 9(3). 
 301. See, e.g., Khushbu Shah & Juweek Adolphe, 400 Years Since Slavery: A 
Timeline of American History, THE GUARDIAN, (Aug. 16, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/aug/15/400-years-since-slavery-timeline 
[https://perma.cc/72XB-REMJ]; Scott Jaschik, Guidance on Diversity,  INSIDE 
HIGHER ED, (Dec. 5, 2011), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/12/05/obama-administration-issues-
affirmative-action-guidance-colleges [https://perma.cc/6H43-V7EB]. 
 302. See supra Section II.A.3. 
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response to past discriminatory practices rather than advantages based on sex 
itself.303  
Just because women and men may be provided the same opportunities 
does not mean that women will have the same access to actually fulfilling the 
end goal and reaching the end result.  For example, if women and men are 
both given the same opportunity to apply for a job, this does not mean that the 
woman will be hired.  Similarly, one would think that hygiene products used 
by both men and women would be the same price.  Since substantive equality 
is focused less on facial neutrality and more on the outcome, a substantive 
equality ideology in the United States would allow women to receive 
advantaged opportunities over men that result in the same or similar 
outcomes.  For example, giving women preferential treatment in applying for 
jobs that results in similar numbers of male and female hires,304 or at the very 
least mandating paid maternity leave and lactation breaks for new moms.305  
The question that the Supreme Court and some South African Justices seem 
to be concerned with is: if laws were implemented that benefit or provide 
advantages to women, will this “promote equality” or is providing support to 
women as a previously disadvantaged class substantiating their status as 
second-class citizens?306  Providing an advantaged opportunity for women as 
a historically disadvantaged class will allow them to step into the same playing 
field as men.  A policy may be facially discriminatory, yet if the result is a 
balancing between the sexes, that balance seems like it should constitute a 
compelling state interest in a nation dedicated to freedom.   
F. Constitutional Classification – The South African Way 
It is evident that the fight for gender equality is a multi-front civil war 
battling for textual inclusion as well as substantive change.  The Equal Rights 
Amendment and inclusive language coupled with Congress’ power to enact 
legislation to further the ERA is a step we need to conquer textual inclusion.  
However, the next step is changing the way equal protection claims are 
analyzed in court by ditching the attempt at establishing three distinct levels 
of scrutiny and move to a case-by-case analysis similar to the unfair 
discrimination test in South Africa.  The levels of scrutiny have not been 
uniformly applied within their respective categories – courts have been 
 
 303. Race, also, should be a substantial factor in receiving advantages to discount 
past discriminatory practices, but race alone should not be the basis for the advantages. 
 304. In the initial affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court recognized that 
affirmative action should not be in place forever, therefore, when equality is achieved 
then these such laws would be unfair. 
 305. And other “benefits” that just equalize the experience of women who have 
babies and are also trying to work. 
 306. KENDE, supra note 5, at 91 (“Do laws that advantage women actually promote 
equality or demonstrate that women remain second-class citizens who need 
assistance? Should laws that have a disparate impact on women automatically be 
illegal even if there is no discriminatory animus?”). 
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applying more of a “sliding scale” analysis allowing them to apply stricter or 
more lenient levels of scrutiny as they see fit.307  Since the current scrutiny 
system is not providing strict guidance – all types of discrimination should 
just be treated with the same level of severity.308  Even though gender 
encompasses inherent differences where race has none, South Africa has been 
able to treat them both as suspect classes while applying a fairness test to 
account for the necessary differences between women and men. 
One type of discrimination should not be more important than another – 
that is the whole point of equality.  The United States should not tolerate any 
differential treatment that disadvantages groups of people.  However, an effort 
should be made to look at differential treatment in the context of fairness 
versus equality.  As has been made clear, women and men have biological 
differences that warrant differential treatment.  A basic formal equality model 
may suggest that women do not deserve advantages to account for the burdens 
imposed by these differences; whereas an equity model would propose 
allowing differential treatment where women are provided advantages that 
place them on equal footing with men.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Gender equality issues have shifted from a simple differentiation 
between men and women to include discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity.  Although this expansion may have 
complicated the interpretation of equality laws, it has enhanced the reality that 
gender rights and women’s rights are human rights and the fight for equality 
will not be over until everyone is equal. 
 “There is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.”309  
Equal opportunity for men and women is not equality – true equality is the 
realization of equal outcomes for men and women.310  American women have 
 
 307.  See supra Section II.A.3.. 
 308. “There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern 
impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases 
and a different standard in other cases.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). Furthermore, I believe that the facts of these cases 
demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis, 
and of employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending 
upon “the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and 
the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is 
drawn.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 459 (1985) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
 309. This quote has been credited to several men throughout history, but regardless 
of who said it, the message is especially relevant to the fight for gender equality. 
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It 
was a wise man who said that there is no greater inequality than the equal treatment 
of unequals”); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 62 Part IX (1999) (translated by Benjamin 
Jowett).  
 310. Equal opportunity means nothing where there is not equal ability. 
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been constitutionally less than men for centuries through the lack of inclusion 
in the Constitution and systemic sexism that pervades every aspect of our 
society.  It is time for the United States to become a Twenty-First Century 
democracy by implementing large-scale change in Equal Protection analyses 
and redefining the American ideal of equality.  By shifting the ideal from 
formal equality to substantive equality, we can focus a new mindset on 









311. Picture Citation: Lamont Davis, Guess What, Equity and Equality Are Not 
the Same Thing, EDUCATIONPOST (Nov. 3, 2016) https://educationpost.org/guess-
what-equity-and-equality-are-not-the-same-thing/. 
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